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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from Orders entered by the Third
Judicial District Court for the State of Utah.

This court has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. S 34-28-5 (1969) (subsequently amended 1989).
Separation from payroll - Resignation - Suspension because of
industrial dispute. (Attached hereto as Addendum Item No. 1.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose from a dispute between Appellant Zoll &
Branch, P.C. ("Zoll & Branch"), and Appellee Alan Asay over wages
due to Mr. Asay, and payment due to Mr. Asay under a contract in
which he sold certain computer equipment to Zoll & Branch.
The case began after Mr. Asay provided Zoll & Branch with
the statutorily required demand for wages due to him.

R. 954-55.

During the mandatory waiting period, Zoll & Branch filed this suit
alleging numerous groundless causes of action including slander,
conversion and fraud.

R. 8-12, 1062.

Mr. Asay counterclaimed

against Zoll & Branch in order to collect the money that was owed
to him as wages and the purchase price of the computer. R. 23-33.
Subsequently, Mr. Asay filed for relief under Chapter 7
of the United States Bankruptcy Code. R. 1030-32. The trustee for
Mr. Asay's estate abandoned to Mr. Asay his counterclaims against
Zoll & Branch, because the wage claim might be subject to an exemption, and both of the claims were relatively small and subject to
litigation. R. 1032. Any claims of Zoll & Branch against Mr. Asay
1

were discharged in the bankruptcy case pursuant to order of the
Bankruptcy Court. R. 450-51. However, the parties hereto proceeded to trial on the basis that the discharge did not effect any offsets to which Zoll & Branch might be entitled against Mr. Asay's
counterclaims.

Id.

After trial, the Third District Court for the State of
Utah, Judge Michael R. Murphy, entered Judgment in favor of Mr.
Asay. R. 464-67 based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of
law included here as Addendum Item No. 5.

Among other things,

Judge Murphy found that Zoll & Branch's motive in "commencing this
action [was] as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning his
legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch" (R. 459, H 32) and that
"there [was] no justification for Zoll & Branch's stop payment
order to its bank with respect to the checks . . . "
Mr. Asay.

issued to

R. 456, H 28.
During the trial, Mr. B. Ray Zoll was the primary witness

for Zoll & Branch. Two witnesses, both of them attorneys licensed
to practice in this State and former employees of Zoll & Branch,
testified that Mr. B. Ray Zoll's character and reputation for truthfulness was

bad

(R.

Mr. Zoll's testimony.

1046, 1068) and

generally

contradicted

R. 1039-55, 1055-73. Mr. Asay also testi-

fied that Mr. Zoll's testimony was not true.

R. 1123-24.

The

Court found that "Zoll & Branch stopped payments on the checks it
issued to Mr. Asay for the sole reason that Mr. Zoll was angered by
the password after he found out what it was. Mr. Zoll's testimony

2

regarding the basis for the offsets claimed by Zoll & Branch is not
credible."

R. 455, H 22.
Following the Judgment, Zoll & Branch filed a Motion for

a New Trial or in the Alternative Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
(the "Motion for a New Trial") . R. 470-76. Pending disposition of
the Motion for New Trial, the court successively stayed execution
on the judgment for limited periods of time through multiple
orders.

R. 525-30, 596-97, and 617-18. Correct copies of each of

the orders staying execution on the Judgment are attached hereto as
Addendum Item No. 6.

The last order stayed execution until the

court ruled upon the Motion for New Trial. R. 617-18.

On 20 July

1993, the court denied the Motion for a New Trial in a document
entitled Summary Decision and Order. R. 632-34.

In rendering its

decision, the court wrote:
Plaintiff [Zoll & Branch] and counterclaim defendant [Zoll & Branch] has moved for
a new trial or to alter or amend judgment.
The motion seeks to change specific findings.
Plaintiff fails to acknowledge, however, that
evidence is not the equivalent of fact. The
court heard all the evidence and, after viewing the demeanor of witnesses and making
judgments of credibility, made its findings.
If, as in this case, there is conflicting
evidence, there will necessarily be a conflict
between the findings and some evidence, the
evidence which the court rejected in its role
as a factfinder.
R. 632.
On June 16, 1993, Mr. As ay moved to augment the judgment
to include additional attorneys' fees accrued in order to preserve,
and collect, the Judgment ("Motion to Augment").
hearing was held on August 2, 1993.

R. 601-03.

A

R. 643. At the commencement

of the hearing, Mr. Zoll offered to make a "proffer."

R. 1151.

Following Zoll & Branch's "proffer" the following occurred:
The Court: Well, I think I need to take some evidence on
the fees•
Mr. Zoll:

You can take it.

I really don't care.

(Whereupon Mr. Zoll exits the courtroom)
The Court: The record should indicate Mr. Zoll is
walking out, and you may put on your
evidence, Mr. Zundel.
* * *

The Court: The record should indicate that I believe
under the circumstances that I have the
power, although I'm not going to use it, of
contempt over Mr. Zoll for his conduct just
now.
However, I'm going to restrain myself and not
exercise that power and jurisdiction, and
we'll proceed with the attorney's fees. And
whatever happens, Mr. Zoll is going to have
to just live with because he's freely chosen
to walk out of this courtroom in a very
abrupt manner.
R. 1153-54.
The court thereafter heard the evidence regarding the
reasonableness of the attorneys' fees incurred by Mr. Asay and took
notice that the stay of execution had expired on July 20, 1993 (12
days prior).

The court thereupon executed its Order Augmenting

Judgment and Releasing Cash Bond to Alan Asay (the "Order Augmenting Judgment") which Asay's counsel had brought with him to the
hearing.

R. 643.
Zoll & Branch now appeals the Summary Decision and Order

and the Order Augmenting Judgment, but no appeal of the judgment
entered at trial has been filed.
4

See Notice of Appeal, H 2.

A

correct copy of the Notice of Appeal is included here as Addendum
Item No. 9.
In its opening brief, Zoll & Branch challenges Findings
Nos. 5, 6, 8, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 25-28, and 32-39 as being
clearly erroneous, and argues that the Court misapplied Utah's wage
payment statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (1969) and that
the court committed procedural error.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Generally an appellate court only reviews a trial court's
factual findings for clear error. The trial court's conclusions of
law are reviewed for correctness.

However, where, as here, the

appellant only appeals the denial of a motion for a new trial, the
appellate court only reviews the denial for an abuse of discretion.
The trial court properly exercised its authority under
Utah Rule of Evidence 611 to control the interrogation of witnesses
in order to avoid needless consumption of time in this case.

The

court scheduled one day for the hearing and allocated one-half day
to each party.

Zoll & Branch waived any objection to the court's

invocation of Rule 611 at trial.
The court properly excluded evidence regarding Mr. Asay's
"mental

condition."

Zoll

& Branch

failed

to

offer

expert

testimony.
The testimony of Garry Willmore was properly admitted
since it was not subject to the attorney-client privilege.

Zoll &

Branch waived any privilege that might have existed by failing to
object to Mr. Willmore's testimony at Mr. Willmore's deposition.
5

Zoll & Branch failed to properly object to the admissibility of Mr.
Willmore's testimony at trial.

Thus, Zoll & Branch failed to

preserve the issue for appeal.
Zoll & Branch has not properly marshalled the evidence
concerning its contentions that the trial court's factual findings
are clearly erroneous.

Zoll & Branch's contentions are based on

the mere fact that evidence contrary to some of the findings
exists. As such, Zoll & Branch's arguments fail to acknowledge the
burden it carries when challenging the trial court's findings of
fact.

The court's findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
Zoll & Branch's contention that the trial court misapplied Utah's wage statutes regarding penalties and attorneys'
fees is based upon Zoll & Branch's misinterpretation of the
statute, and upon Zoll & Branch's bold assertions that the court's
findings of fact are erroneous. The trial court properly assessed
penalties against Zoll & Branch and awarded to Mr. Asay the
attorneys' fees he incurred as costs of the suit.
Zoll & Branch did not tender payment of the wages due to
Mr. Asay as it argues. Zoll & Branch's deposit with the court was
not an unconditional offer of payment. The money was not available
to Mr. Asay until Mr. Asay successfully litigated this matter
against Zoll & Branch. Zoll & Branch's deposit could not have been
a "form of interpleader" as it argues, since there were never more
than two parties to this action.

6

The reasonableness of attorneys' fees in this case must
be determined in light of all relevant factors, and not solely
based on the amount in controversy as Zoll & Branch suggests. The
court considered the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees charged
in this case and properly determined that the fees were reasonable
in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Contrary to Zoll &
Branch's contentions, it was given an opportunity to cross-examine
Mr. Asay's counsel regarding the fees but chose to use its time
elsewhere.
To the extent that Zoll & Branch complains of the
attorneys' fees awarded in the Order Augmenting Judgment, Zoll &
Branch waived its right to object to this order when its counsel,
Mr. Zoll, walked out of the courtroom at the commencement of the
hearing.

The award of attorneys' fees was well supported by the

record before the trial court and is not clearly erroneous.
Zoll & Branch's allegations of impropriety stem from its
insistence that the court improperly released a supersedeas bond to
Mr. Asay. The bond in this case was filed pursuant to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 62(b) and was not a supersedeas bond. The stay of
execution on the judgment, as amended, had expired at the time the
bond was released to Mr. Asay.

Therefore the court properly

released the bond to Mr. Asay.
Mr. Asay is entitled to recover his attorneys' fees
incurred as a result of this appeal.

Under the general rule, a

prevailing party who received attorney fees below is also entitled
to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.

7

Furthermore, Zoll &

Branch's appeal is frivolous, and Mr. Asay is entitled to fees on
appeal pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a).
Because the trial court's findings of fact are well
supported by the record and its rulings of law are correct, the
trial court's denial of Zoll & Branch's Motion for a new trial was
not an abuse of discretion.

ARGUMENTS
I.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
Generally, an appellate court will only review the trial

court's factual findings for clear error.
Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991).

E.g., Cummings v.
The trial court's

conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.

Id.

In the

present case, Zoll & Branch has not appealed the underlying judgment in this matter.

Rather, Zoll & Branch appeals the Summary

Decision and Order, whereby the trial court denied Zoll & Branch's
Motion for a New Trial, and the Order Augmenting Judgment.

Since

the underlying judgment under Rule 59 is not on appeal, nothing in
this case is reviewed without recognizing broad discretion in the
trial court.
With regard to the denial of Zoll & Branch's Motion for
a New Trial, it is well settled that the trial court has broad
discretionary power to grant or deny a motion brought under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 59. E.g., Hancock v. Planned Development
Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 184 (Utah 1990); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d
170, 173 (Utah 1983).

An appellant bears the heavy burden of

showing that the trial court's denial of such a motion was a clear
8

abuse of discretion. Hancock v. Planned Development Corp., supra;
Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986); Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991).

Under Anderson v. Toone,

supra, when the motion for a new trial is based upon an allegation
that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, an appellate
court will not reverse the denial of the motion unless the
"evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable
and unjust."

671 P.2d at 173.

In this case, the trial court's

rulings were proper and its findings of fact are well supported by
the record.

Zoll & Branch has not shown otherwise.

With respect to the Order Augmenting Judgment, Zoll &
Branch fails to carry its burden on appeal to show that the
findings of the trial court were clearly erroneous, or that its
conclusions of law were incorrect. Therefore, the Order Augmenting
Judgment must be affirmed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S PROCEDURAL RULINGS WERE PROPER AND DO
NOT CONSTITUTE PROCEDURAL ERROR.
A.

The court properly exercised its authority under
Utah Rule of Evidence 611 to control the
interrogation of witnesses and avoid needless
consumption of time in this case.

Zoll & Branch complains that the court scheduled only one
full day for the trial of this case, and limited each party to onehalf of the day for the presentation of its case.
Brief, p. 31.

Appellant's

In its Summary Decision and Order, from which Zoll

& Branch appeals, the trial court explained that
The court was very concerned about this case,
invoked Rule 611, Utah Rules of Evidence,
9

allocated 50% of the trial day to each party
and was timekeeper for the time consumed.
Plaintiff actually used more time than defendant and had adequate time to present its
claims and defenses. It was the plaintiff's
decision how it was to use its time. It is
the court's view that plaintiff misallocated
its time, spending too much time on unimportant matters and too little on important
matters.
R. 633.
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 611, the trial court has
considerable discretion to manage the introduction of evidence and
to see that it is presented efficiently.
852 P.2d 997, 998-99 (Utah 1993).

In re Estate of Russell,

The appellate court will review

the lower court's rulings based on Rule 611 only for abuse of
discretion.

Id.

Zoll & Branch's contention is based on its assertion that
the time constraints did not allow it to present its entire case.
Appellant's Brief, p. 31.

However, shortly after 2:00, when the

court reconvened from the lunch break, the court stated "[a]s we
proceed with this case I'm seeing the wisdom of my invocation of
Rule 611," to which Mr. Zoll replied "I am, too."

R. 1002, 1008.

Furthermore, long after Zoll & Branch's allotted time had expired,
the court asked counsel for Zoll & Branch M[w]hat other witnesses,
if you were allowed to call them, would you call?"

R. 1117. Tom

D. Branch, co-counsel for Zoll & Branch, responded
Myself, and Mr. Steven Branch your honor.
My testify [sic] would be corroborating Mr.
Zoll's, except for I guess it would be the
fact that he testified about the billing logs.
Steve Branch's testimony would be that he
looked for the billing logs. That would be
10

cumulative, as well, so I think that in the
interest of time I think we have put in the
substantive evidence we need.
R. 1117-18 (emphasis added).

Clearly, Zoll & Branch waived any

objection it had regarding the court's invocation of Rule 611.
Only after the court rendered its decision against Zoll & Branch
did it protest the court's invocation of Rule 611.
B.

Evidence regarding Mr. Asay's "mental condition" was
properly excluded.

Zoll & Branch asserts that the trial court erred in
sustaining Mr. Asay's objection to Zoll & Branch's question
regarding Mr. Asay's medical history.

Zoll & Branch argues that

Mr. Asay's medical history is admissible under Utah Rule of
Evidence 608.

Appellant's Brief, 31.

Rule 608 allows evidence

regarding the credibility of a witness, in the form of opinion or
reputation, only

if it refers to character for truthfulness or

untruthfulness.
After the court sustained Mr. Asay's objection, Zoll &
Branch explained that the question was intended to elicit evidence
that Mr. Asay had a "mental condition" which Zoll & Branch claimed
affected his credibility.

R. 971-71.

Zoll & Branch conceded,

however, that it was not prepared to offer expert testimony on the
issues. Id. The trial court properly ruled that a lay witness was
not qualified to establish that a "mental condition" affected an
individual's credibility and thus excluded the evidence.

11

Id.

C.

The court properly admitted the deposition testimony
of Mr. Willmore.

Zoll & Branch asserts error because of the admission of
the testimony of Mr. Willmore and argues that the testimony invaded
the attorney-client privilege. Zoll & Branch's argument fails for
three reasons:

first, the testimony was not protected by the

attorney-client privilege; second, even assuming that a privilege
existed, Zoll & Branch waived the privilege by failing to properly
object to the taking of Mr. Willmore's testimony at deposition; and
third, Zoll & Branch failed to properly object to the testimony at
trial.
1.

The testimony of Mr. Willmore was
protected by attorney-client privilege.

not

Under Utah Rule of Evidence 504(b), only confidential
communications between a client and his attorney that pertain to
the subject matter

for which

the attorney was retained

are

protected under the attorney-client privilege. Utah R. Evid. 504.
Non-confidential communications, or those which are unrelated to
the attorney-client relationship are not protected under the
privilege.

Id.

At trial, Mr. Asay's counsel read

into the record

portions of Mr. Willmore's deposition regarding Mr. Willmore's
communications with Mr. Asay, his experience using the computer
system that Mr. Asay sold to Zoll & Branch, the non-existence of
facts concerning Mr. Asay's employment

supportive of

Zoll &

Branch's claims, and the poor reputation of Mr. Zoll among members
of the legal community for truth and veracity.

12

R. 1039-48. None

of the excerpts

read

into the record

addressed

confidential

communications between Zoll & Branch and its counsel in any way.
Thus,

the

excerpts

do

not

fall

within

the

attorney-client

privilege.
2.

Even assuming that a privilege existed, it was
waived by failing to object to the taking of
Mr, Willmoreys deposition.

The attorney-client privilege may be waived if the holder
thereof voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any
significant part of the communication.

Utah R. of Evid. 507.

M

[I]f the holder of the privilege fails to claim his privilege by

objecting to disclosure by himself or another witness when he has
an opportunity to do so, he waives his privilege as to the
communications so disclosed."

E. Cleary, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 93,

at pp. 223-24 (3d. ed. 1984).

The privilege is waived as to

communications between a client and its attorney that are made in
the presence of third persons whose presence is not reasonably
necessary under the circumstances.

Hofmann v. Conder, 712 P.2d

216, 216-17 (Utah 1985).
When Mr. Asay's counsel deposed Mr. Willmore, Zoll &
Branch did not object to the deposition or to any of the questions
based on the attorney-client privilege.

R. 1038.

By failing to

object, Zoll & Branch allowed disclosure of all matter contained in
Mr. Willmore's deposition.
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3.

Zoll & Branch failed to Properly Object at
Trial to the Admissibility of Mr, Willmore's
Testimony with Regard to Attorney-Client
Privilege.

Under Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1), error may not be
predicated upon a ruling that admits evidence unless a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the
specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context.

When asserting the attorney-client

privilege, a bald assertion of privilege is insufficient.

4 J.

Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 2 6.60 [01],
p. 26-162 (2d. ed. 1985). Rather, the privilege must be invoked as
to specific questions or documents.

Id.

When the deposition testimony of Mr. Willmore was offered
at trial, Zoll & Branch initially objected to the reading of less
than the entire transcript of the testimony of Mr. Willmore and
then subsequently on the basis that the testimony violated the
attorney-client privilege.

R. 1035-1037.

The court properly

reserved its ruling on the latter issue, but invited Zoll & Branch
to object again if the proffered question was subject to an
unwaived privilege. R. 1038. The court stated "[w]ell, let's hear
the question and make your objection, then I'll determine whether
it's been waived. And if not waived, whether it is subject to the
attorney-client privilege."

Id.

Thereafter, both parties offered relevant excerpts from
the deposition testimony without objection by Zoll & Branch based
on attorney-client privilege. R. 1039-55. After the testimony was
received, Zoll & Branch did not move to strike it.
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III.

THE COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS IN THIS CASE ARE SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE, AND ZOLL & BRANCH HAS NOT PROPERLY
MARSHALLED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING ITS CONTENTIONS
TO THE CONTRARY.
In order to successfully challenge the correctness of a

trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must ordinarily first
marshal

all

the

evidence

supporting

the

findings, and

then

demonstrate that, viewed in the light most favorable to the lower
court's findings, the evidence is legally insufficient to support
the findings. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899
(Utah 1989).

In this regard, this court has recently stated:

This court will not lightly disturb a
trial court's findings of fact. In challenging a court's findings of fact on appeal, an
appellant must marshal all 'the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of evidence, thus
making them clearly erroneous.' If
appellant

fails to marshal the evidence, we will assume
that the record supports the trial
court's
findings
of fact and proceed to review the
accuracy of the trial court's conclusions of
law.

Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App.
1993) (emphasis added and citation omitted).1

In Clayton, the

court noted that the appellant had merely selected those facts and
excerpts that supported its position and re-argued those facts as
if its appeal were a trial de novo.

Id.

This court stated that

such an approach "ignores the heavy burden that [the appellant]

x

The court's statements in Clayton are of particular significance to the
present case since Mr. Zoll, counsel for Zoll & Branch, also represented the
appellants in Clayton.
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must carry to properly challenge the trial court's findings of
fact."

Id.
Once the evidence is properly marshalled, the standard by

which the sufficiency of the evidence is judged is set out in Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

Rule 52(a) states:

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
In the present case, Zoll & Branch fails to marshal the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Rather, similar
to what the appellant did in Clayton. Zoll & Branch selects only a
portion of the relevant evidence and then reargues its factual
position.
Zoll & Branch fails to carry the additional burden of
showing that the trial court's denial of Zoll & Branch's Motion for
a New Trial was an abuse of discretion.
A.

If all of the evidence were marshal led. there is
sufficient evidence to support each of the court's
factual findings.
1.

Factual Finding No, 5,

Zoll & Branch contests Finding No. 5 which states,
During his employment with Zoll & Branch,
Mr. Asay learned to distrust Mr. B. Ray Zoll.
Consequently, near the end of his employment,
Mr. Asay placed the password "fuckoff" on the
computer system to ensure that he controlled
the system until a final agreement for its
purchase was reached.
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Zoll & Branch argues that the finding is clearly erroneous because
testimony existed that Mr. Asay was "attempting to block access to
certain files." Appellant's Brief, p. 13.
The

unstated

context

of

the

snippet

of

testimony

presented by Zoll & Branch concerns negotiations over the price of
the computer system purchased by Mr. Asay and sold to Zoll &
Branch.

The record states:

[Counsel]

Did the delay in negotiations in reaching a
final figure concern you?

[Asay]

Yes, it did.

[Counsel]

Why?

[Asay]

I was a f r a i d t h a t t h e r e would be some e f f o r t
t o take c o n t r o l of the computer system on
t h e i r p a r t . In other words, change the l o c k s
or somehow make the computer system u n a v a i l a b l e t o me, or simply take i t . Find some way
of e x e r c i s i n g leverage i n t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s .
So I p r o t e c t e d the computer system.

R. 941.

In i t s b r i e f ,

Zoll & Branch concedes t h a t t h i s

passage

"could support a f i n d i n g of the motive as c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n Finding
No. 5."

A p p e l l a n t ' s B r i e f , p. 1 3 . 2
The record supports the c o u r t ' s

used the password t o block a c c e s s

f i n d i n g t h a t Mr. Asay

to certain

f^les

because

2

he

Zoll & Branch a l s o argues that because Mr. Asay t e s t i f i e d t h a t he
f e l t no o b l i g a t i o n t o a s s i s t Zoll & Branch a f t e r he l e f t , t h a t t h e password
placed on t h e computer before he l e f t was somehow an act of anger and revenge.
A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief, p. 13. Zoll & Branch's argument i s not only i r r e l e v a n t , i t
d i s t o r t s Mr. Asay's testimony by presenting i t out of c o n t e x t .
When read i n
c o n t e x t , in t h e passage t o which Zoll & Branch r e f e r s , Mr. Asay t e s t i f i e d
So I f e l t no o b l i g a t i o n t o do s o . I would have
done s o , and did do so as a favor. I f e l t sympathetic
toward Garry, who was in a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n , having t o
do something t h a t he had had no experience or t r a i n i n g
i n . But I d i d n ' t f e e l l i k e I had any o b l i g a t i o n t o Zoll
& Branch t o do i t .
(R. 990 (Emphasis added.))
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distrusted Zoll & Branch. Therefore, Factual Finding No. 5 cannot
be said to be clearly erroneous.
2.

Factual Finding No. 6.

Finding No. 6 states:
Mr. Asay placed the password on the word
processing files using the standard WordPerfect command, "Password"/"Add". Once the
password was revealed, it could be removed by
using the standard WordPerfect command,
"Pas sword"/"Remove".
Once again Zoll & Branch refers vaguely to evidence that
supports the court's finding, but does not marshal that evidence
and present it to the appellate court. Appellant's Brief, p. 14.
In the referenced passage, counsel for Zoll & Branch asks
Mr. Asay whether certain files were locked and Mr. Asay responded
"No. It was accessible by giving the password."

R. 1021.

In

addition to this testimony, Zoll & Branch fails to acknowledge the
following testimony of Mr. Willmore, which also supports the
finding:
[Counsel]

Did he show you what files were in the
computer?

[Willmore] He did.
[Counsel]

Did he reveal to you all passwords regarding —

[Willmore] He did.
* * *

[Counsel]

But he gave you the password?

[Willmore] He did give me the password.
[Counsel]

So was the access in fact blocked?

[Willmore] No.
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[Counsel]

Okay. Did you eventually learn how to remove
the password?

[Willmore] Yes, I did.
[Counsel]

What did it take to remove the password?

[Willmore] It was a very simple application of — it was
part of the Word Perfect [sic] program, I had
understood based on —
[Counsel]

It was part of Word Perfect —

[Willmore] It was part of the Word Perfect program, yes.
[Counsel]

It was a standard Word Perfect Command?

[Willmore ] Yes.
[Counsel]

How long did it take you to remove a password
when the password would come up?

[Willmore] Perhaps 15 seconds.
R. 1041-43. In addition, Zoll & Branch's witness, Mr. Van Valkenberg, testified that the password was a WordPerfect function and
could easily be removed once the password was known.

R. 1098.

Contrary to Zoll & Branch's contentions, Mr. Van Valkenberg's
testimony does not rebut this finding, but rather confirms it.
3.

Factual Finding No, 15.

Factual Finding No. 15 states

,f

[t]he password provided

full access to every file in the computer system.
Mr. Asay sabotage the computer in any way."

At no time did

R. 454, IF 15.

In

addition to the testimony that Zoll & Branch vaguely refers to (R.
987, 1043, 1123), unmarshalled testimony by Mr. Willmore states
that Mr. Asay had been "extremely helpful," had shown him the files
on the computer and had revealed the password, and that access to
the computer's files was not blocked.
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R. 1041-42.

Zoll & Branch ignores Mr, Willmore's testimony and selectively presents other testimony that it interprets as supporting
its position that additional passwords existed. Appellant's Brief,
15.

Once again, Zoll & Branch:
fails to acknowledge . . . that evidence is
not the equivalent of fact. The court heard
all the evidence and, after viewing the
demeanor of witnesses and making judgments of
credibility, made its findings.
If# as in
this case, there is conflicting evidence,
there will necessarily be a conflict between
the findings and some evidence, the evidence
which the court rejected in its role as factfinder.

Summary Decision and Order, R. 632.
4.

Factual Finding No. 16.

Factual Finding No. 16 states:
Any problems which Zoll & Branch had in accessing the computer system either pre-existed
the exchange of the password for the check for
the computer system or were the result of Zoll
& Branch or its representatives being untrained or uneducated in the use of the computer
system.
R. 454, 1f 16.
Zoll & Branch challenges Factual Finding No. 16. Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-16

However, it presents absolutely no

evidence to support or contradict the court's finding.

Id.

Mr. Van Valkenberg testified that his first visit was in
late November or early December and at that time Zoll & Branch did
not have the password. R. 1093.

Mr. Asay's testimony confirmed

that Mr. Van Valkenberg's first visit occurred before he left the
firm, and consequently before the sale of the computer to Zoll &
Branch or the exchange of the password.
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R. 1123.

Mr. Van

Valkenberg also testified that upon his second visit the password
had been revealed.

R. 1096. Furthermore, Mr. Asay testified that

prior to his departure he had hidden files on the computer, but
that when he left the firm all files were exposed and he gave the
password to all files upon his departure.

R. 1123.

It is

irrelevant whether or not Mr. Asay chose to protect the files with
a password or by hiding them while he owned the computer.

The

evidence supports the court's finding that Mr. Asay revealed the
password to Zoll & Branch at the time of sale.
Zoll & Branch argues that even if Finding No. 16 is
correct, the denial of access to files should be considered
sabotage because Mr. Asay said that Mr. Willmore had called him
numerous times for help in accessing files. Appellant's Brief, p.
16.

Not only does Zoll & Branch's version of Mr. Asay's testimony

not support its conclusion, Zoll & Branch distorts Mr. Asay's
testimony once again. Mr. Asay's testimony was that Mr. Willmore's
problems were

not related

to the password, but to

inexperience with the computer.
5.

his

own

R. 988-90.

Factual Finding No. 8.

The amount of time which Mr. Asay billed
during his employment with Zoll & Branch was
fair and consistent with his obligation to
Zoll & Branch and its clients and was fairly
and accurately reported on Mr. Asay's time
sheets.
R. 453.
Zoll & Branch challenges this finding on the basis that
Mr. Zoll expected more hours than were billed, and that Mr. Zoll
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testified that this was a condition of employment.

Appellant's

brief, p. 16.
However, Zoll & Branch again misrepresents the witness'
testimony.

In stating that Mr. Zoll expected

7-8 billable hours

per day, Mr. Asay and his former fellow associate of Zoll & Branch,
Mr. Drake, were expressly distinguishing Mr. Zoll's expectations
from the conditions of their employment. R. 963-64, 975-76, 1057.
Furthermore, Zoll & Branch ignores other testimony that because of
the administrative tasks Mr. Asay was required to perform, such as
secretarial work and delivering documents to the court, Mr. Asay
was not able to bill the expected number of hours per day. R. 977;
453, H 9.

Zoll & Branch also fails to acknowledge that Mr. Zoll's

testimony, as quoted in Appellant's Brief at page 17, was controverted by Mr. Asay's testimony, who testified that Mr. Zoll's
testimony was untrue.

R. 1123-24.

When all of the evidence is viewed in its proper light,
giving due regard to the trial court's opportunity to evaluate the
witnesses' demeanor and credibility, there is ample evidence to
support the court's finding.
6.

Factual Finding No. 11.

Following negotiations, Zoll & Branch
agreed to buy only the computer system for
$1,030.00, which was the fair market value of
the computer system.
Mr. Asay accurately
represented all material facts to Zoll &
Branch during the negotiations.
Zoll & Branch contests the trial court's finding that the
price it paid for the computer was fair market value, and that Mr.
Asay had accurately represented all material facts to Zoll & Branch
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during negotiations. Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-19.

In support of

its argument it cites Mr. Van Valkenberg's testimony that the total
price paid was in excess of the computer's value at the time of the
sale, and that replacing a 1987 disk with a 1984 disk would lessen
the value of the computer.

Id.

Zoll & Branch's argument about value does not inform the
court of what the valuation issue was between Zoll & Branch and Mr.
Asay. Mr. Asay testified that he had negotiated with Zoll & Branch
over the point in time at which the computer should be valued,
whether at the time purchased by Asay or at the time of the
proposed sale to Zoll & Branch.

R. 942. The computer originally

purchased by Mr. Asay was used almost exclusively in his employment
with Zoll & Branch. Id. The price finally agreed upon represented
a compromise.

Id.

Zoll & Branch also fails to acknowledge Mr. Asay's
testimony that the 1987 hard drive was replaced because it had
completely stopped working.

R. 995.

Under the circumstances,

replacing the failed hard disk with a drive manufactured earlier
did not necessarily affect the value of the computer.
7.

R. 995.

Factual Finding No. 17.

The trial court found that:
None of Defendant's actions and conduct
regarding the computer system were improper or
inappropriate.
R. 454, H 17.

Zoll & Branch's arguments focus on Mr. Asay's

replacement of a broken 1987 hard drive with a working 1984 hard
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drive.3

As noted above, the hard drive that was removed from the

system had completely stopped working.
After

evaluating

all

of

R. 995.
the

evidence,

the

determined t h a t none of Mr. Asay's conduct was improper.
brief,

Zoll

& Branch

offers

only

a portion

of

the

court
In i t s

evidence

presented t o the court and d i s t o r t s t h a t evidence by p r e s e n t i n g i t
t o t h i s court out of c o n t e x t .

Therefore, Zoll & Branch has not

properly marshalled the evidence.
8.

Factual Finding No. 19.

Zoll & Branch c h a l l e n g e s the t r i a l c o u r t ' s finding t h a t :
When Mr. Asay l e f t Zoll & Branch, he l e f t
behind a l l of h i s work product p e r t a i n i n g t o
any case on which he had worked.
Mr. Asay
a l s o properly l e f t behind h i s time s h e e t s at
Zoll & Branch, which should have been found by
Zoll & Branch on the premises with no
d i f f i c u l t y whatsoever.
Zoll & Branch misrepresents the testimony t h a t i t
in i t s brief.
business

cites

Mr. Asay t e s t i f i e d as t o the ordinary course of

with regard t o

the manner i n which he submitted

b i l l i n g s , s t a t i n g "I d i d n ' t a c t u a l l y turn them i n .

his

They were j u s t

always kept i n a p l a c e on my desk, and the s e c r e t a r y would come and
get them."

R. 967.

Mr. Asay t e s t i f i e d that i t was h i s custom t o

In an attempt t o show that Mr. Asay had acted inappropriately, Zoll
& Branch a l s o quotes Mr. Van Valkenberg's testimony regarding Mr. Asay's p o s s i b l e
motives for hiding f i l e s . Appellant's Brief, p. 20. However, Zoll & Branch does
not point out that immediately following the testimony which i t quotes in i t s
b r i e f , t h e court sustained an o b j e c t i o n t o that very testimony.
(R. 1104)
Furthermore, the testimony i s i r r e l e v a n t t o the i s s u e , s i n c e , as
already s t a t e d , the evidence i n d i c a t e s that Mr. Van Valkenberg's f i r s t v i s i t ,
wherein he found the hidden f i l e s t o which he referred, was before the computer
was s o l d t o Zoll & Branch, and while i t was s t i l l owned by Mr. Asay, and that Mr.
Asay had exposed a l l f i l e s before s e l l i n g the computer. (Supra at 20; R. 1123.)
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leave his billing sheets on his desk for Mr. Zoll's secretary to
collect, but since he had already moved his desk from the office,
he left them on the floor because that was "as close as possible to
the same location."

R. 969; see also, R. 1012, 1059-61.

Zoll & Branch also ignores the testimony of Mr. Drake
that supports the court's findings. Mr. Drake testified that as he
remembered, Mr. Asay's practice was to place the time-sheets in a
box on his desk for the secretary to collect.

R. 1060-61.

When read in proper context, the passage cited by Zoll &
Branch does not show that the ordinary course of business was for
Mr. Asay to hand-deliver his time sheets to a secretary.

In

addition, Mr. Asay testified that all computer disks that he took
with him upon leaving were disks that he had purchased himself that
Zoll & Branch had not purchased from him, and that all work product
was left on the computer's hard drive.

R. 1016, 1021.

Once again, Zoll & Branch has failed to marshal all of
the evidence.
9.

Factual Finding No. 22,

In Finding No. 22, the trial court found that:
In defense of Zoll and Branch's actions,
Mr. Zoll testified that he stopped payment on
the checks because Zoll & Branch had offsetting claims against Mr. Asay. The Court disagrees . Zoll & Branch stopped payment on the
checks it issued to Mr. Asay for the sole
reason that Mr. Zoll was angered by the password after he found out what it was. Mr.
Zoll's testimony regarding the basis for the
offsets claimed by Zoll & Branch is not
credible.
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R. 455, 11 22. Zoll & Branch challenges this finding as unsupported
by the record, and then simply cites Mr. Zoll's testimony, which
the court found not to be credible, to show that the claimed
offsets were legitimate.

Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22.

Zoll &

Branch also quotes Mr. Van Valkenberg's testimony wherein Mr. Van
Valkenberg testifies as to what Mr. Zoll had told him.

Id. at 23.

In the quoted portion of the record Mr. Zoll attempts to
justify the claimed offsets based upon three factors:

(1) the

password; (2) the valuation of the computer; and (3) Mr. Asay's
billing statements. Appellant's Brief, p. 22. Each of the three
factors asserted to justify Zoll & Branch's claimed offsets are
addressed above. As noted above, Zoll & Branch has not marshalled
the evidence regarding the issues that it argues to support its
claimed offsets.
Zoll & Branch merely ignores its burden on appeal and the
trial court's role as a judge of the witness's credibility.
10.

Factual Findings Nos. 25-28.

Zoll & Branch's challenge to Findings Nos. 25-28 relies
upon its premise that the other findings challenged by Zoll &
Branch are clearly erroneous.

Appellant's Brief, p. 23.

Factual Findings 25 through 28, the court found that:
25. Mr. Asay did not convert any
documents or other property of Zoll & Branch
to his own use.
26. Mr. Asay did not make any misrepresentation to Zoll & Branch regarding any
aspect of the computer he sold to Zoll &
Branch.
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In

27. Mr. Asay did not slander Zoll &
Branch as alleged in the complaint filed by
that firm.
28. There is no justification for Zoll &
Branch's stop payment order to its bank with
respect to the checks at issue in this case.
R. 456.
Zoll & Branch summarily challenges these findings as
"contrary to facts found in the transcript, especially in regard to
Wilmore's [sic] own deposition testimony, to Asay's misrepresentations pertaining to the computer, to the justification for Zoll &
Branch's stop payment order, and to respondent's failure to fulfill
his part of the employment agreement, as has been argued above."
Appellant's Brief, p. 23.

Each of Zoll & Branch's contentions

regarding these findings is addressed above, and need not be
reargued here.
These findings are well supported by the record and by
the other findings of the court upon which findings 25 through 28
rest.

Even if the evidence had been properly marshalled, the

findings are not clearly erroneous.

Therefore, Factual Findings

Nos. 25-28 must also be affirmed.
11.

Factual Finding No. 32.

In its Factual Finding No. 32, the trial court expressly
found that "[d]uring the trial of the above-entitled actions, the
testimony of Mr. Asay was more credible than the testimony of Mr.
Zoll." R. 457, U 32. Zoll & Branch challenges this finding on the
grounds that there is no support for it in the record, and (without
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citing the record) that it is "controverted by facts in the
transcript."

Appellant's Brief, p. 24.

It is expressly within the province of the trial judge's
authority to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
P. 52(a).

Utah R. Civ.

Furthermore, once again Zoll & Branch fails to marshal

the evidence which supports the trial court's finding. In addition
to the intangible evidence, such as the demeanor of the witnesses,
the court received unrebutted testimony from two separate witnesses
regarding Mr. Zoll's lack of credibility. Both of these witnesses
are members in good standing of the Utah State Bar, and both had
worked as employees of Zoll & Branch. Mr. Willmore testified that
Mr. Zoll's reputation in the legal community for truth and veracity
was "extremely poor."

R. 1046.

Similarly, Mr. Drake testified

that other attorneys "don't have a high opinion of Mr. Zoll" for
truthfulness.
Based

R. 1068.
upon

the

trial

court's

observation

of

the

witnesses, and the testimony regarding Mr. Zoll's credibility, the
trial court's finding that Mr. Asay's testimony was more credible
than Mr. Zoll's is not clearly erroneous.
12.

Factual Findings Nos. 33-38.

In its Findings Nos. 33-38, the trial court states:
33. Mr. Asay is entitled to receive the
following monetary damages from Zoll & Branch
as a result of Zoll & Branch's failure to pay
Mr. Asay his wages due and its failure to pay
for the computer system:
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Principal

Wages and Penalties;
Wage check 12/01/88 Statutory Continuation
of Salary -

$

1,500.00

$

6,000.00

Plus interest from 02/01/89I
through 01/08/93 @ 10% or
18 days
$ 2.05479 per diem for 1,438

$

7,500.00

$

2,951.79

$

1,030.00

Breach of Contract;
Computer payment
Plus interest from 12/01/88
through 01/08/93 @ 10% or $ .2821
per diem for 1,498 days

327.10

Attorneys' Fees;
Through preparation of Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment
Out-of-pocket expenses and costs
TOTAL DAMAGES:

$ 12,000.00
1,602.79
$ 25,411.68

34. Mr. Asay is also entitled to
additional interest from and after January 8,
1993, at the rates provided under Utah Code
Ann. §§ 15-1-1 and 15-1-4.
35. The Court has considered all of the
relevant factors in determining the reasonableness of the fees and costs requested by Mr.
Asay and his attorneys. In this regard the
testimony of Mr. Asay, who is a licensed
attorney in this state, was helpful as well
as the affidavit of Mr. Asay's counsel, Mr.
Michael N. Zundel. The Court also observed the
organized and efficient manner in which Mr.
Asay's counsel conducted the presentation of
Mr. Asay's case at trial. All of the services
provided by Mr. Asay's counsel were reasonable
and necessary.
36. The hourly rates charged to Mr. Asay
by his attorneys, for their time and the time
of their paralegals, are reasonable in light
of the training, experience and expertise of
the service providers and as measured by the
hourly rates customarily charged for similar
services in the Salt Lake City community.
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Interest

37. Through November 30, 1992, a total
of 129.30 hours of legal services were provided to Mr. Asay by his attorneys in connection with Mr. Asay's attempts to recover the
wages do him from Zoll & Branch. The hours of
service were necessitated by the actions of
Zoll & Branch both before and after this
action was begun, including the following
actions: 1) failing to pay Mr. Asay the wages
justly due him, 2) commencing this action as a
tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning
his legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch,
3) refusing to provide discovery as required
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 4)
alleging numerous defenses, including factually contested offsets, to Mr. Asay's claims.
38. Upon consideration of all of the
circumstances it is the judgment of this court
that Mr. Asay should be awarded $12,000.00 in
attorneys' fees through the preparation of the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment in this case and that Mr. Asay's
attorneys' out-of-pocket costs of $1,602.79
should also be awarded.
With regard to Findings Nos. 33-38, Zoll & Branch
concedes that the record supports the findings, but then merely
states that Zoll & Branch "rebuts these findings."
Brief, p. 24.

Appellant's

Once again Zoll & Branch ignores its burden to

marshal all of the evidence, and then to show that the court's
findings are clearly erroneous.
IV.

ZOLL & BRANCH'S CONTENTION THAT THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE
STATUTE IS BASED UPON A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE
AND ITS CONTENTION THAT THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Zoll & Branch argues that the trial court's reliance on

Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (1969) (subsequently amended 1989) is
improper for three reasons: first, it argues that the statute was
misconstrued; second, it reargues against the court's factual
findings that contradict its position that no wages were due to Mr.
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Asay because of a claimed set-off; and third, it argues that it
properly tendered payment by depositing money with the court as a
"form of interpleader."

Appellant's Brief, pp. 32-36.

Zoll &

Branch's construction of the statute is contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute.

As already noted, the court's factual

findings have not been shown to be clearly erroneous.

While Zoll

& Branch may have deposited funds with the court, there was no
tender of payment of the wages due to Mr. Asay. Therefore, Zoll &
Branch's arguments are each without merit.
A.

The trial court properly applied Utah Code Ann.
S 34-28-5 (1969) to award Mr, Asay damages for
wages wrongfully withheld by Zoll & Branch.

Zoll & Branch argues that because Mr. Asay voluntarily
quit or resigned his employment. The court should have relied only
on Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5(2) and that it was improper to rely on
the penalty provision of section 34-28-5(1).
pp. 32-34.

Appellant's Brief,

Zoll & Branch argues that the trial court's construc-

tion of the statute is against public policy and that M[t]his court
must take the blinders off the Third District Court judge who
believes that statutes should be broadly applied in all cases
against employers."

Appellant's Brief, p. 38.

It is a well recognized rule of statutory construction
that where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
court need not look beyond the language of the statute to determine
its meaning.

E.g., OSI Industries v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 860

P.2d 381, 384 (Utah App. 1993); Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857
P.2d 263, 265 (Utah App. 1993).

While the court will not ignore
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the statute's plain meaning, under Utah law the courts are to
liberally construe statutes with a view to effect the objects of
the statutes and to promote justice.
(1993).

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2

See also. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357# 1373 (Utah

App. 1993) (Garff, J., concurring).
Section 34-28-5 states:
(1) Whenever
an employer
separates
an
employee from his payroll, the unpaid wages
shall become due immediately, and the employer
shall pay such wages to the employee within 24
hours of the time of separation at the specified place of employment.
In case of failure to pay wages due an
employee within 24 hours of demand therefor,
the wages of such employee shall continue from
the date of separation until paid, but in no
event to exceed sixty days, at the same rate
which the employee received at the time of
separation.
The employee may recover the
penalty thus accruing to him in a civil
action. This action must be commenced within
sixty days from the date of separation. Any
employee who has not made a demand for payment
shall not be entitled to any such penalty
under this subsection.
(2) Whenever an employee (not having a
written contract for a definite period) quits
or resigns his employment, the wages earned
shall become due and payable not later than 72
hours thereafter, unless such employee shall
have given 72 hours' previous notice o-f his
intention to quit, in which latter case such
employee shall receive his wages at the specified place of payment at the time of quitting.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5 (1988) (emphasis added).
Under the plain meaning of section 34-28-5, subsection
(1) provides for a penalty where an employer fails to pay wages due
an employee within 24 hours of a demand therefor, and subsection
(2) defines the point in time wages become due when an employee
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quits or resigns his employment.

This statue must be read as a

whole and not in piecemeal fashion in order to effect the objects
of this statute and to promote justice.
Comm'n,

Silver v. State Tax

820 P.2d 912 (Utah 1991).
Zoll & Branch failed to pay the wages due to Mr. Asay

within 24 hours of the time they became due, and continued to
refuse to pay Mr. Asay's wages. Mr. Asay ultimately received his
wages only after executing upon the Judgment entered by the trial
court in this case. Therefore, it was proper for the court to rely
on the plain meaning of section 34-28-5 and apply the penalties
provided therein to this case.
Zoll & Branch also argues that a bona fide dispute
existed as to the wages. Appellant's Brief, p. 35, citing Chatterlv v. Omnico, 485 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah App. 1971).

Zoll & Branch

cites cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that where
an employer acts reasonably and in good faith, and where the
failure to pay was not willful, the penalty provision should not
apply.

Appellant's Brief, p. 35.
The cases cited by Zoll & Branch are inapposite to the

present case.

The trial court expressly rejected Zoll & Branch's

claim that it had acted reasonably and in good faith, by finding
that "Zoll & Branch stopped payment on the checks it issued to Mr.
Asay for the sole reason that Mr. Zoll was angered by the password
after he found out what it was" and that Zoll & Branch had commenced suit against Mr. Asay "as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into
abandoning his legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch."
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R. 455,

H 22; 459, H 37.

Zoll & Branch's argument t h a t i t s f a i l u r e t o pay

was not wilful and was due to the claimed s e t - o f f

amount i s not

c o n s i s t e n t with the facts of t h i s c a s e .
B.
Because the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a c t u a l findings a r e not
c l e a r l y erroneous, Zoll & Branch's contention t h a t
t h e p e n a l t i e s under Utah Code Ann, S 34-28-5 (1988)
should not have been applied i n t h i s case i s
without m e r i t ,
Zoll & Branch argues in the a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t the wages
were not " j u s t l y due" t o Mr. Asay because Zoll & Branch claimed a
set-off.4

A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief, p . 34.

However, the t r i a l

court

expressly found t h a t the evidence regarding Zoll & Branch's claimed
r i g h t of s e t - o f f was not c r e d i b l e .

R. 455, H 22.

The facts on which Zoll & Branch r e l i e s for i t s argument
are c o n t r a d i c t e d by the t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings.

Zoll & Branch has

not properly marshalled the evidence supporting these findings, and
consequently has not shown t h a t the c o u r t ' s findings are c l e a r l y
erroneous.

Therefore, Zoll & Branch's argument t h a t Mr. Asay's

wages were not j u s t l y due has no basis beyond Mr. Z o l l ' s

bald

assertions.
C.

Zoll & Branch did not properly tender payment of
t h e wages due t o Mr. Asay.

Zoll & Branch deposited $1,176.75 with the court c l e r k
which i t c h a r a c t e r i z e s as a "Tender of Payment" or a "form of

4

In support of i t s claimed r i g h t of s e t - o f f Zoll & Branch c i t e s UCA § 34-283(5).
Prior t o 1989 no s e c t i o n numbered 34-28-3(5) e x i s t e d in Utah S t a t u t e s .
The s t a t u t e s were amended in 1989 t o add UCA § 3 4 - 2 8 - 3 ( 5 ) . Since a l l material
events in t h i s case occurred prior t o 1989, UCA § 34-28-3(5) (1989) i s
i n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s c a s e , QSI Industries v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, supra, at
383 (Party i s e n t i t l e d t o have i t s r i g h t s determined on the b a s i s of the law as
i t e x i s t e d at the time of the occurrence, and a l a t e r s t a t u t e or amendment should
not be applied r e t r o a c t i v e l y so as t o deprive a party of i t s r i g h t s . )
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interpleader".

Appellant's Brief, p. 34.

However, " [a] tender

requires that there be a bona fide, unconditional, offer of payment
of the amount of money due, coupled with an actual production of
the money or its equivalent."

Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538

P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975) (emphasis added).

Zoll & Branch has

never unconditionally offered payment to Mr. Asay of the entire
amount due him.

A deposit of money into court pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-27-4 with instructions to the clerk to hold the
money until Mr. asay proves his entitlement thereto is not the same
as a tender. Wash. Nat. Ins. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 670
(Utah App. 1990); Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah
1990); Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Utah App.
1989).
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 68(a) a defendant may
avoid paying costs where he has tendered

payment

to the

plaintiff

prior to the commencement of the action, and then deposits the
money with the court.

Rule 68(a) states:

When in an action for the recovery of
money only, the defendant alleges in his
answer that before the commencement of the
action he tendered to the plaintiff the full
amount to which the plaintiff was entitled,
and thereupon deposits in court for the
plaintiff the amount so tendered, and the
allegation is found to be true, the plaintiff
cannot recover costs, but must pay costs to
the defendant.
Zoll & Branch's mischaracterization of its deposit as a
"form of interpleader" is absurd. Interpleader is a form of action
whereby the plaintiff may join multiple parties as defendants, each
of whom may have a claim against the plaintiff, in order to protect
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the plaintiff from double or multiple liability.
22.

Utah R. Civ. P.

In the present case there are only two parties to the action,

Zoll & Branch and Mr. Asay.

There was no risk that Zoll & Branch

could be subject to multiple liability.
THE ATTORNEYSr FEES AWARDED IN THIS CASE ARE REASONABLE.

V.

The trial court has broad discretion in determining what
constitutes a reasonable attorneys' fee.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988).

Dixie State Bank v.

On appeal the court will

review the trial court's determinations only for a clear abuse of
discretion.
(Utah 1982);

Id.; see also Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657

P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982).

The trial court properly exercised

its discretion and determined a reasonable attorneys' fee to be
awarded in the present case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1
(1969).
A.

The reasonableness of t h e f e e s i n t h i s c a s e must be
determined i n l i g h t of the a l l f a c t o r s d e s c r i b e d i n
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken and i t s progeny.

In A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief, Zoll & Branch c o r r e c t l y d e s c r i b e s
the process by which the reasonableness of an a t t o r n e y s ' f e e should
be measured, but then ignores t h i s p r o c e s s .
28-30.

A p p e l l a n t ' s B r i e f , pp.

Zoll & Branch argues t h a t the fee i n t h i s c a s e i s e x c e s s i v e

merely because i t i s " c l e a r l y disproportionate t o the small amount
i n i t i a l l y involved." 5

A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief, p. 30.

5

Zoll & Branch's

In i t s b r i e f Zoll & Branch s t a t e s that the amounts of the checks were for
$1,176.75 and $1,030.00 r e s p e c t i v e l y , and that the a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s are over
$20,000.00.
Appellant's Brief, p. 30.
Zoll & Branch's j u x t a p o s i t i o n of the
f i g u r e s i s misleading and inaccurate, and exaggerates the claimed d i s p a r i t y
between f e e s and damages in t h i s c a s e .
(continued...)
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argument ignores the manner by which a court is to judge the
reasonableness of a fee.
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) ,
the Utah Supreme Court explained the process by which a trial court
should examine the reasonableness of a fee award.

The court

explained that the trial court should find answers to the following
four questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

What legal work was actually performed?
How much of the work performed was
reasonably
necessary
to
adequately
prosecute the matter?
Is the attorney's billing rate consistent
with the rates customarily charged in the
locality for similar services?
Are there circumstances which require
consideration of additional factors,
including those listed in the Code of
Professional Responsibility?

Id. at 990.
In Dixie State Bank, the court further explained that
[i]n addition, although the amount in
controversy can be a factor in determining a
reasonable fee, care should be used in putting
much reliance on this factor. It is a simple
fact in a lawyer's life that it takes about
the same amount of time to collect a note in
the amount of $1,000 as it takes to collect a
note for $100,000.
Id.

See also Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985)

("The

amount of damages awarded in a case does not place a

5

(...continued)

Zoll & Branch's calculations do not accurately represent the damages
in this case nor the attorneys' fees awarded. The damages awarded to Mr. Asay,
with interest and penalties, totalled $11,808.89.
R. 547-58, U 33.
The
attorneys' fees awarded totalled $12,000.00, plus an additional $1,602.79 in outof-pocket expenses.
Id.
The initial award of attorneys' fees was later
augmented to include an additional $4,471.86 in fees incurred by Mr. Asay to
preserve and collect the judgment. R. 649.
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necessary limit on the amount of attorneys
awarded.")

fees that can be

As noted by the Justice Stewart of the Utah Supreme

Court
" [a]s a general rule, the amounts recoverable
under the FLSA and the [Utah Payment of Wages
Act] are so small that attorney fees will
exceed any potential recovery. Hence, unless
an award of attorney fees is available,
workers would be unable to enforce their
rights under these statutes.
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 474 (Utah 1992) (Stewart, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
In the present case, the trial court considered the four
factors outlined in Dixie State Bank, and determined that the
attorneys' fees in this case are reasonable. The trial court found
the following:
35. The Court has considered all of the
relevant factors in determining the reasonableness of the fees and costs requested by
Mr. Asay and his attorneys. In this regard
the testimony of Mr. Asay, who is a licensed
attorney in this state, was helpful as well as
the affidavit of Mr. Asay's counsel, Mr.
Michael N. Zundel. The Court also observed
the organized and efficient manner in which
Mr. Asay's counsel conducted the presentation
of Mr. Asay's case at trial.
All of the
services provided by Mr. Asay's counsel were
reasonable and necessary.
[Step #2]
36. The hourly rates charged to Mr. Asay
by his attorneys, for their time and the time
of their paralegals are reasonable [Step #3]

in light of the training, experience and
expertise of the service providers and as
measured by the hourly rates customarily
charged for similar services in the Salt Lake
City community.
37.

Through November 30, 1992, a

total

of 129.30 hours of legal services were provided to Mr. Asay by his attorneys in connec-
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tion with Mr. Asay's attempts
to recover
the
wages do him from Zoll & Branch.
[Step #1]
The hours of service
were necessitated
by the
actions
of Zoll & Branch both before and after
this action was begun, [Step #4] including the
following actions: 1) failing to pay Mr. Asay
the wages justly due him, 2) commencing this
action as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into
abandoning his legitimate claims against Zoll
& Branch, 3) refusing to provide discovery as
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and 4) alleging numerous defenses, including
factually contested offsets, to Mr. Asay's
claims.
R. 458-59 (emphasis added).
The amount of the fees was reasonable in light of the
circumstances of this case.

Zoll & Branch does not present any

reason to support its contention that the fees are excessive except
that, based upon its exaggerated and misleading calculations, the
fees awarded are disproportionate to the amount in controversy. As
such, Zoll & Branch fails to meet its burden to show that the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding fees as it did, and the
trial court's award of attorneys' fees must be upheld.
B.

Zoll & Branch was given opportunity to crossexamine Mr, Asay's counsel regarding the attorneys'
fees in this case.

During the trial of this matter, the court was presented
with the testimony of Mr. Asay, a licensed attorney in this state,
regarding the reasonableness of the work performed by Mr. Asay's
counsel. Mr. Asay testified that H. . . 1 haven't ever found that
there's been any overkill or that things have been overdone" and
that ". . .my opinion is that the charges are reasonable and that
the services were necessarily provided."
testimony was unrebutted.
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R. 956-57.

Mr. Asay's

The court received the Affidavit of Michael N. Zundel,
counsel for Mr. Asay, regarding the reasonableness of the fee.
R. 953-54.

The court asked Mr. Zoll whether he would stipulate

that Mr. Asay's Counsel would testify consistent with its affidavit
concerning the fees charged.

R. 954.

Mr. Zoll so stipulated,

subject to the right of cross-examination.

Id.

The court then

granted Zoll & Branch the right to cross-examine Mr. Asay's counsel
regarding the fees and accepted Mr. Asay's counsel's affidavit into
evidence. R. 954-55. Thereafter, during the presentation of Zoll
& Branch's evidence, the court periodically notified Zoll & Branch
as to the amount of time remaining, and after Zoll & Branch
exhausted its allotted time, the court allowed Zoll & Branch to use
substantially more than its allotted time.

R. 1014, 1026. After

having used more time than it was entitled to, Zoll & Branch
objected that it was not given additional time in which to crossexamine Mr. Asay's counsel.

R. 1125.

Zoll & Branch now asserts that it had no opportunity to
cross-examine Mr. Asay's counsel because the court did not continue
to grant additional time for Zoll & Branch to do so. Appellant's
Brief, p. 31.

By recognizing Zoll & Branch's right to cross-

examine Mr. Asay's counsel, the trial court does not grant unlimited time to do so.

Zoll & Branch had opportunity to cross-examine

Mr. Asay's counsel but chose to use its time elsewhere.

Zoll &

Branch's argument that it was not given opportunity to crossexamine Mr. Asay's counsel is simply false.
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C.

Zoll & Branch waived its right to contest attorneys' fees awarded in the Order Augmenting Judgment
when its counsel exited the courtroom at the commencement of the hearing regarding these fees.

In addition to the fees awarded to Mr. Asay in the Judgment, Zoll & Branch contests that portion of the fees that were
awarded at the August 2, 1993 hearing to augment the Judgment.
Appellant's Brief, p. 32.

All attorneys' fees charged by Mr.

Asay's counsel in this case have been reasonable. Furthermore, any
objection Zoll & Branch had to the fees awarded at this hearing was
waived when Zoll & Branch's counsel, Mr. Zoll, walked out of the
courtroom at the commencement of the hearing and did not return.
In Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517 (Utah App.
1989), the plaintiff appealed, inter alia, on the basis that the
trial court had awarded less than the full amount of attorney's
fees sought.

In that case the court was presented with the testi-

mony of the plaintiff's attorney and furnished with specific
details of the time expended in support of the attorney's fees.
Id.

There was no objection raised by defendants to the testimony

and, in fact, neither the defendants nor their attorneys attended
the hearing on the fees.

Id. Under these circumstances the court

held that the trial court had abused its discretion in not awarding
the plaintiff the entire amount of the fee sought without a finding
that the fee was unreasonable.
Since the

Id.

trial court was

furnished

with

specific

unrebutted evidence of the time spent, the rates charged, and the
necessity of the work, under Martindale it would have been an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to award Mr. Asay less than the
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full amount of the fees in question in the motion to augment the
judgment.

Zoll & Branch did not object to the evidence, and has

not created any record whatsoever to show that the fees were excessive.

The court's findings are supported by the evidence, and do

not show an abuse of discretion.
D.

Any disparity between fees in this case and the
amount in controversy is attributable to Zoll &
Branch, who cannot now complain that its own
actions increased the cost of litigating this case.

Zoll & Branch accuses the trial court of simply granting
Mr. Asay's motion to augment the attorneys' fees awarded in this
case without examining the supporting affidavits.
Brief, p. 32.

Appellant's

In support of its argument it quotes the record

where the court granted Mr. Asay's Motion to Augment after Zoll &
Branch's counsel prematurely exited the courtroom.

Id. However,

the court's language immediately following the portion quoted by
Zoll & Branch is enlightening as to the justification for the
amount of attorneys' fees expended in this case. After receiving
the affidavit of Mr. Asay's counsel and hearing the evidence
regarding the fees, the court stated:
Your request will be granted.
The
judgment is to be augmented in the amount of
$4,461.86 as additional fees and costs.
Further to what you indicated, I think
that Mr. Zoll's conduct towards the court, who
quite obviously is not an adversary in this
matter, probably reflects upon the additional
fees caused by the way he handled this matter.
more
fees
been
your

And if he had handled the matter in a
professional manner, that the amount of
that have been accrued would not have
accrued, and I believe that was part of
theory in the first place.
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R. 1158 (emphasis added).
Zoll & Branch's tactics have added to the expense of this
litigation and are exemplified by Mr. Zoll's repeated refusals to
attend or submit to scheduled depositions.

In an attempt to

schedule Mr. Zoll's deposition, Mr. Asay's counsel sent Mr. Zoll a
letter listing 8 days that were acceptable and requesting that Mr.
Zoll

notify

preferable.

Mr. Asay's

counsel

as

to which

time would

be

R. 77. The letter stated that if Mr. Zoll failed to

respond the deposition would be scheduled on a specified date. Id.
Because Mr. Zoll did not respond, the deposition was scheduled and
Mr. Zoll was notified of the time and place approximately three
weeks in advance.

Id.

Pursuant to requests from Mr. Zoll the

deposition was rescheduled twice. Id. Finally Mr. Asay's counsel
had a subpoena issued ordering Mr. Zoll to appear at the scheduled
time.

Id.

On the morning of the scheduled deposition, Mr. Zoll

called to inform Mr. Asay's counsel that he would attend but was
running late. Id. Mr. Zoll appeared at the deposition 40 minutes
late, proffered a statement listing the excuses why he could not
continue, and began to leave.

Id.

Mr. Asay's counsel attempted

to question Mr. Zoll regarding his statement, but Mr. Zoll
interrupted him and stated:
You don't have anything to say.
(To the reporter) Give me a copy of the
information that's been given.
And I'll see you another date or your
motion to compel, [sic] Whatever you have —
Whatever rights you have you can, of course,
exercise those. Thank you gentlemen — I mean
Mister and Ms.
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R. 11.

Mr. Zoll then abruptly left the proceeding, as he later did

at the hearing to augment fees.

Id.

In Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 985, the court recognized that a party should not be allowed to use tactics to increase
the costs of litigation and then contest an award of attorneys'
fees on the basis that they are excessive in light of the amount in
controversy.

In the present case, the trial court recognized Zoll

& Branch's tactics for what they were, i.e., "an attempt to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning his legitimate claims."
U 37.

R. 459,

Through its own dilatory and frivolous tactics, Zoll &

Branch has increased the cost of litigating this matter.

Zoll &

Branch's unsupported claim that the fees in this case are excessive
is not grounds to overturn the trial court's finding that the fees
are reasonable.
VI.

THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANY RULE 62(d) SUPERSEDEAS BOND
POSTED IN THIS CASE. THE RULE 62(b) BOND THAT WAS POSTED
WAS PROPERLY RELEASED TO MR. ASAY.
In its statement of the case, Zoll & Branch alludes to

alleged impropriety on the part of the trial court and counsel for
Mr. Asay by stating that "the trial court judge improperly violated
a stay of execution on the supersedeas bond" and allowed "Respondent Asay to make an ex parte motion".

Appellant's Brief, p. 7.

Although Zoll & Branch does not address the statement further in
its brief, Asay will address the matter here.
Zoll & Branch's contention that the trial court acted
inappropriately centers around its assertion that a "supersedeas
bond" was improperly released to Asay.
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Id.

In support of its

assertion, Zoll & Branch relies on the trial court's Order Granting
Zoll & Branch's Motion for a Stay of Execution and releasing
Garnishment (the "Stay"), A copy of the Stay is attached hereto at
Addendum Item No. 6.

The Stay states:

ORDERED, that upon compliance with all of
the provisions of this Order by Zoll & Branch,
all proceedings and actions to enforce or
collect the judgment entered in this case in
favor of Alan Asay shall be stayed until May
25, 1993 (8 weeks and 30 days after February
23,1993), or until thirty days after Zoll &
Branch's motion for a new trial and motion to
alter or amend judgment are heard and decided
by this Court, whichever first occurs;
R. 526. (emphasis added).
The Stay was granted pursuant to Rule 62(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Stay, p. 1

R. 525-27.

In contrast to sub-

section (d) (pertaining to supersedeas bond), subsection (b),
allows the court to stay the execution of a judgment pending the
disposition of the following motions: 1) a motion for a new trial
or to alter or amend judgment; 2) a motion for relief from judgment
or order; 3) a motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for
a directed verdict; or 4) a motion for amendment to the findings or
for additional findings.

By its express terms, the Stay expired

upon the earlier of 25 May 1993 or 30 days after Zoll & Branch's
motion for a new trial and motion to alter or amend judgement were
heard and decided by the court.

Zoll & Branch has persistently

maintained that its security was posted as a supersedeas bond
because "TENDER AS SUPERSEDIOUS [sic] /SECURITY BOND" was typed on
the certificate of deposit receipt submitted to the court, despite
the court's rejection of Zoll & Branch's position.
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R. 515.

On 25 May 1993, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties,
the court signed an Order Allowing Extension of Bond Expiration
Date (the "First Extension") that postponed expiration of the bond
until 25 June 1993. R. 596-97.

A copy of the First Extension is

attached hereto at Addendum Item No. 6.

The First Extension did

not in any way alter the nature of the security, and expressly
stated that the bond would expire on 25 June 1993. Id.
The stay was further extended by the court's order dated
23 June 1993 (the "Second Extension") because the court's file on
this case had been lost.

R. 617-18.

A copy of the Second Exten-

sion is attached hereto at Addendum Item No. 6.

By the express

terms of the Second Extension, the stay was extended until the
court's file could be found and until Zoll & Branch's Motion for a
New Trial could be ruled upon.

Id.

The court's file was located

and the Motion for a New Trial was denied on 20 July 1993, thereby
terminating the stay and all extensions.

R. 632-33.

On 2 August 1993, the court properly recognized that no
stay was in effect and released the cash held by the court clerk to
Mr. Asay in partial satisfaction of the judgment in Mr. Asay's
favor.

As noted, at this time the Stay, the First Extension and

the Second Extension had by their own express terms expired.
Zoll & Branch's allegations of misconduct on the part of
the trial court and Mr. Asay's counsel are entirely without justification, and are absolutely chimerical.

Throughout this matter,

Mr. Asay's counsel has carefully followed all court procedures and
rules despite Zoll & Branch's insistence on ignoring court deter-

46

minations, rules, and decorum, and persistent attempts to falsify
the record by, inter alia, asserting the existence of a supersedeas
bond with no good faith basis when in fact no supersedeas bond
existed.
VTI.

MR. ASAY IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS COSTS ON APPEAL,
INCLUDING AN AWARD FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES.
A.

Mr. As ay is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees
under Utah Code Ann. S 34-27-1 (1988).

Under Utah law, attorneys' fees may generally only be
recovered where provided for by contract or statute.

E.g., Dixie

State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d at 988.
"The general rule is that when a party who received
attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled
to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App. 1991); Brown v.
Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah App. 1992).

Where a contract

provides a basis for awarding attorneys' fees, the courts have
consistently held that such a provision includes attorneys' fees
incurred for the appeal of the matter. See, e.g. , Management Services v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980);
Centurian Corp. v. Cripps, 624 P.2d 706, 713 (Utah'1981); Edward's
Pet Supply v. Bentley, 652 P.2d 889, 890 (Utah 1982).

In Martin-

dale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah App. 1989) this court applied the general rule to award attorney fees on appeal where the
plaintiff had been awarded fees at trial pursuant to the mechanics
lien statute.

In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.

1990), the court stated that where fees are awarded in divorce
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actions pursuant to statute, fees should also ordinarily be awarded
on appeal.
In the present case, Mr, Asay's award of attorneys' fees
is based on Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1.

Therefore, Mr. Asay is en-

titled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees which he has incurred
in order to defend the judgment on appeal.
B.

Zoll & Branch's appeal is frivolous.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) provides that the
court shall award just damages to the prevailing party, which may
include single or double costs and attorney fees, where the court
determines that an appeal is frivolous. An appeal is frivolous if
it is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Utah R. App. P. 33(b).

See also, e.g. , O'Brien v. Rush,

744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987) (A frivolous appeal is one without a reasonable legal or factual basis).

In Utah Dept of Social

Services v. Adams, supra, this court held that "an appeal brought
from an action which is properly determined to be in bad faith is
necessarily frivolous under Utah R. App. P. 33." 806 P.2d at 1197.
The trial court expressly found that this action was
commenced as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning his
legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch. R. 459. Zoll & Branch's
action was therefore brought in bad faith, and this appeal is
frivolous.

Zoll & Branch's appeal is not grounded in fact nor

warranted by existing law, and contains no good faith argument to
extend, modify or reverse existing law.
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Mr. Asay is therefore

entitled to recover his costs incurred on appeal, including reasonable attorneys' fees from Zoll & Branch and its counsel, B. Ray
Zoll, personally.

CONCLUSION
Throughout its brief Zoll & Branch misrepresents and
distort's the record of this case in order to disguise itself as a
legitimate employer victimized by a "total miscarriage of justice."
Zoll & Branch handed checks to Mr. Asay upon his final departure
from the firm to pay his wages and to purchase Mr. Asay's computer
system.

After Mr. Asay had left the firm, Zoll & Branch stopped

payment on the checks. When confronted by Mr. Asay, Zoll & Branch
filed this action as a tactic to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning
his legitimate claims against them. Utah's wage statutes, and the
penalties provided therein, are designed to protect employees
against these types of tactics.
The burden on the appellant in this case is to show that
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing a new trial, and
it has fallen far short of carrying that burden. Zoll & Branch has
not marshaled the evidence and shown that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. In fact, the credible evidence in this
case supports the trial court's findings.
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in
managing the trial under Utah R. Civ. P. 611, or making evidentiary
rulings.
Nor does the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-5
provide any basis for a new trial; in fact, section 34-28-5 is
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intended to address precisely this type of factual situation. See
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d at 471-72.
The trial court awarded unpaid wages, statutory penalties, and attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1, the wage
payment statute's "mandatory attorney fee provision, which requires
the court to grant a successful plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee
. . . ." Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d at 469. Moreover, the trial
courts findings on the reasonableness and amount of the fees are
not clearly erroneous.
This appeal is the latest episode in a nearly five-year
effort by Zoll & Branch to "to pressure Mr. Asay into abandoning
his legitimate claims against Zoll & Branch."

Such harassment

should not be tolerated.
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of February, 1994.
Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn
A Professional Corporation

By:
Attorneys ior Appellee Alan Asay
KWHP053.006
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voluntarily leaving the service of any person, company or corporation with intent and for the purpose of
preventing such employee from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other person, company or corporation.
1969
34-24-2. Violation — Penalty.
If any person blacklists or publishes, or causes to be
blacklisted or published, any employee discharged by
any corporation, company or individual, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee
from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other corporation, company or individual, or shall in any manner conspire or contrive by
correspondence or otherwise to prevent such discharged employee from securing employment, such
person is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not less
than $55 nor more than $1000 and imprisoned in the
state prison not less than sixty days nor more than
one year.
1969
CHAPTER 25
FELLOW SERVANTS
Section
34-25-1.
34-25-2.

"Vice-principal" defined.
"Fellow servant" defined.

34-25-1. "Vice-principal" defined.
All persons engaged in the service of any person
and entrusted by such employer with authority of superintendence, control or command of other persons
in the employ or service of such employer, or with
authority to direct any other employee in the performance of any duties of such employee, are vice-principals of such employer, and are not fellow servants.
1969

34-25-2. "Fellow servant" defined.
All persons who are engaged in the service of any
employer and who while so engaged are in the same
grade of service and are working together at the same
time and place and to a common purpose, neither of
such persons being entrusted by such employer with
any superintendence or control over his fellow employees, are fellow servants with each other; but
nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to
make the employees of such employer fellow servants
with other employees engaged in any other department of service of such employer. Employees who do
not come within the provisions of this section shall
not be considered fellow servants.
1969
CHAPTER 26
WAGES A PREFERRED DEBT
Section
34-26-1.
34-26-2.
34-26-3.
34-26-4.

Extent and condition of preference.
Claim — Notice.
Claim — Exceptions — Contest.
"Wages" defined.

34-26-1. Extent and condition of preference.
If any property of any person is seized through any
process of any court, or when his business is suspended by the act of creditors or is put into the hands
of a receiver, assignee, or trustee, either by voluntary
or involuntary action, the amount owing to workmen,
clerks, traveling or city salesmen, or servants, for
work or labor performed within five months next preceding the seizure or transfer of the property shall be
considered and treated as preferred debts, and the

workmen, clerks, traveling and city salesmen, and
servants shall be preferred creditors, the first to be
paid in full. If there are not sufficient proceeds to pay
them in full, then the proceeds shall be paid to them
pro rata, after paying costs. No officer, director, or
general manager of a corporation employer or any
member of an association employer or partner of a
partnership employer is entitled to this preference.
1987

34-26-2. Claim — Notice.
Any such employee, laborer or servant desiring to
enforce his claim for wages under this chapter shall
present a statement under oath to the officer, person
or court charged with such property within ten days
after the seizure of it on any process, or within thirty
days after the same may have been placed in the
hands of any receiver, assignee or trustee, showing
the amount due after allowing all just credits and
setoffs, the kind of work for which such wages are due
and when performed. Any person with whom any
such claim shall have been filed shall give immediate
notice thereof by mail to all persons interested, and, if
the claim is not contested as provided in Section
34-26-3, it shall be the duty of the person or the court
receiving such statement to pay the amount of such
claim or claims to the person or persons entitled
thereto, after first paying all costs occasioned by the
seizure of such property, out of the proceeds of the
sale of the property seized.
1969
34-26-3. Claim — Exceptions — C o n t e s t
Any person interested may within ten days after
the notice of presentment of said statement contest
such claims, or any part of them, by filing exceptions
to them supported by affidavit with the officer or
court having the custody of such property, and thereupon the claimant shall be required to reduce his
claim to judgment in some court having jurisdiction
before any part thereof shall be paid. The person contesting shall be made a party defendant in any such
action and shall have the right to contest such claim,
and the prevailing party shall recover proper costs.
1969

34-26-4. "Wages" defined.
Whenever used in this chapter, "wages" shall mean
all amounts due the employee for labor or services,
whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time,
task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculating such amount.
1969
s/

CHAPTER 27

ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SUITS FOR WAGES
Section
34-27-1.

Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs.

34-27-1. Reasonable amount — Taxed as costs.
Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, servant, or other employee shall have cause to bring suit
for wages earned and due according to the terms of
his employment and shall establish by the decision of
the court that the amount for which he has brought
suit is justly due, and that a demand has been made
in writing at least fifteen days before suit was
brought for a sum not to exceed the amount so found
due, then it shall be the duty of the court before
which the case shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff a
reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the amount
found due for wages, to be taxed as costs of suit. 1969

CHAPTER 28
PAYMENT OF WAGES
Section
34-28-1.

Public and certain other employments
excepted.
34-28-2.
Definitions.
34-28-3.
Regular paydays — Currency or negotiable checks required — Deposit in
financial institution — Statement of
total deductions.
34-28-4.
Notice of paydays — Failure to notify a
misdemeanor.
34-28-5.
Separation from payroll — Resignation
— Suspension because of industrial
dispute.
34-28-6.
Dispute over wages — Notice and payment.
34-28-7.
Payment at more frequent intervals permitted — Agreements to contravene
act prohibited.
34-28-8.
Subcontractors — Compliance with act.
34-28-9.
Enforcement of chapter.
34-28-10.
Employers' records — Inspection by
commission.
34-28-11.
Commission may employ assistants.
34-28-12.
Violations — Misdemeanor.
34-28-13.
Assignment of wage claims — Powers of
commission — Award of attorneys'
fees.
34-28-14.
Actions by commission as assignee —
Costs need not be advanced.
34-28-15 to 34-28-18. Repealed.
34-28-1.

Public and certain other employments
excepted.
None of the provisions of this chapter shall apply to
the state, or to any county, incorporated city or town,
or other political subdivision, or to employers and employees engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural or horticultural pursuits or to stock or poultry
raising, or to household domestic service, or to any
other employment where an agreement exists between employer and employee providing for different
terms of payment, except the provisions of Section
34-28-5 shall apply to employers or employees engaged in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural, horticultural or stock or poultry raising.
1973
34-28-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) The word "employer" includes every person,
firm, partnership, association, corporation, receiver
or other officer of a court of this state, and any
agent or officer of any of the above-mentioned
classes, employing any person in this state.
(2) The word "wages" means all amounts due the
employee for labor or services, whether the amount
is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculating such
amount.
1969

34-28-3.

Regular paydays — Currency or negotiable checks required — Deposit in financial institution — Statement of
total deductions.
Every employer shall pay to his employees the
wages earned semimonthly or twice during each calendar month on days to be designated in advance by
the employer as the regular payday; provided, that
the employer shall pay for services rendered during
each semimonthly period within ten days after the

close of such period; provided, that when the semimonthly payday shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or
legal holiday, payment of wages earned during the
semimonthly period shall be made on the day preceding such Saturday or Sunday, or legal holiday. Whenever the employer hires his employees on a yearly
salary basis, then the employer may pay the employee on a monthly scale, the wages shall be paid by
the seventh of the month following the month for
which services were rendered. He shall pay such
wages in full, in lawful money of the United States,
or checks on banks convertible into cash on demand
at full face value thereof.
No person, firm or corporation or agent, or officer
shall issue in payment of wages due or to become due
or as an advance on wages to be earned for services
performed or to be performed within this state any
order, check or draft, unless it is negotiable and payable in cash, on demand, without discount, at a bank,
the name and address of which must appear on the
instrument.
If an employee voluntarily authorizes an employer
to deposit wages due or to become due, or an advance
on wages to be earned, in a bank, savings and loan
association, credit union or other financial institution
in the State of Utah, the employer may so deposit
until the authorization is terminated.
If any deduction is made from the wages paid, the
employer shall, either semimonthly or monthly at the
employer's option, furnish the employee with a statement showing the total amount of each deduction,
provided that only one total need be shown to include
all standing deductions of fixed amounts, unless otherwise agreed by employer and employee.
1977
34-28-4. Notice of paydays — Failure to notify a
misdemeanor.
(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to notify
his employees at the time of hiring of the day and
place of payment, of the rate of pay, and of any
change with respect to any of these items prior to the
time of the change. Alternatively, however, every employer shall have the option of giving such notification by posting these facts and keeping them posted
conspicuously at or near the place of work where such
posted notice can be seen by each employee as he
comes or goes to his place of work.
(2) Failure to post and to keep posted any notice or
failure to give notice as prescribed in this section
shall be deemed a misdemeanor and punishable as
SUCh.

34-28-5.

1969

Separation from payroll — Resignation
— Suspension because of industrial
dispute.
(1) Whenever an employer separates an employee
from his payroll, the unpaid wages of such employee
shall become due immediately, and the employer
shall pay such wages to the employee within 24 hours
of the time of separation at the specified place of payment.
In case of failure to pay wages due an employee
within 24 hours of a demand therefor, the wages of
such employee shall continue from the date of separation until paid, but in no event to exceed sixty days,
at the same rate which the employee received at the
time of separation. The employee may recover the
penalty thus accruing to him in a civil action. This
action must be commenced within sixty days from the
date of separation. Any employee who has not made a
demand for payment shall not be entitled to any such
penalty under this subsection.

34-28-6
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(2) Whenever an employee (not having a written
contract for a definite period) quits or resigns his employment, the wages earned shall become due and
payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless
such employee shall have given 72 hours' previous
notice of his intention to quit, in which latter case
such employee shall receive his wages at the specified
place of payment at the time of quitting.
(3) In t h e e v e n t of t h e suspension of work as t h e
r e s u l t of a n i n d u s t r i a l dispute, t h e w a g e s e a r n e d a n d
u n p a i d a t t h e t i m e of t h i s suspension shall become
d u e a n d p a y a b l e a t t h e n e x t r e g u l a r payday, a s provided in Section 34-28-3, i n c l u d i n g w i t h o u t a b a t e m e n t or r e d u c t i o n all a m o u n t s d u e all persons whose
work h a s b e e n s u s p e n d e d a s a r e s u l t of such indust r i a l dispute, t o g e t h e r w i t h a n y deposit or o t h e r guara n t y held by t h e employer for t h e faithful perform a n c e of t h e d u t i e s of t h e e m p l o y m e n t .
1969
34-28-6.

Dispute over w a g e s — Notice and pay-

ment.
In case of a dispute over wages, the employer shall
give written notice to the employee of the amount of
wages which he concedes to be due and shall pay such
amount without condition within the time set by this
chapter; but acceptance by the employee of any such
payment made shall not constitute a release as to the
balance of his claim.
1969
34-28-7.

Payment at more frequent intervals
permitted — Agreements to contravene act prohibited.
Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way
limit or prohibit the payment of wages or compensation at more frequent intervals, or in greater
amounts or in full when or before due, but no provisions of this act can in any way be contravened or set
aside by a mutual agreement.
1969
34-28-8.

Subcontractors — Compliance with
act.
Whenever any person shall contract with another
for the performance of work, then it shall be the duty
of such person to provide in the contract that all
wages earned pursuant to the contract shall be paid
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and
in the event that any wages earned under the contract shall not be paid as required in this act, such
person shall be civilly liable for all wages for work
performed under such contract in the same manner
as if the employees entitled to such wages were directly employed by such person.
1969
34-28-9. Enforcement of chapter.
(1) (a) The Industrial Commission shall ensure
compliance with this chapter, investigate any alleged violations of this chapter, and determine
the validity of any claim for any violation of this
chapter filed with it by an employee.
(b) The amount of $50 constitutes the minimum wage claim that the commission may accept.
(2) (a) An abstract of any final award may be filed
in the office of the clerk of the district court of
any county in the state. If so filed, it shall be
docketed in the judgment docket of that district
court.
(b) The time of the receipt of the abstract shall
be noted by the clerk and entered in the judgment docket.
(c) If filed and docketed, the award constitutes
a lien from the time of the docketing upon the
rpal nronertv of the employer situated in the
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county, for a period of eight years from the date
of the award unless previously satisfied
(d) Execution may be issued on the award
within the same time and in the same manner
and with the same effect as if the award were a
judgment of the district court.
(3) (a) The county attorney for the county in which
the plaintiff or the defendant resides, depending
on the district in which the final award is docketed, shall represent the commission on all appeals and shall enforce judgments.
(b) The county shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees, as specified by the Industrial Commission, and costs for:
(i) appeals where the plaintiff prevails; and
(ii) for judgment enforcement proceedings.
(4) (a) The Industrial Commission may enter into
reciprocal agreements with the labor department
or corresponding agency of any other state or
with the person, board, officer, or commission authorized to act on behalf of that department or
agency, for the collection in any other state of
claims or judgments for wages and other demands based upon claims previously assigned to
the Industrial Commission.
(b) The Industrial Commission may, to the extent provided for by any reciprocal agreement entered into under Section 34-38-9, or by the laws
of any other state, maintain actions in the courts
of the other states for the collection of any claims
for wages, judgments, and other demands and
may assign the claims, judgments, and demands
to the labor department or agency of any other
state for collection to the extent that may be permitted or provided for by the laws of that state or
by reciprocal agreement.
(c) The Industrial Commission may, upon the
written request of the labor department or other
corresponding agency of any other state or of any
person, board, officer, or commission of that state
authorized to act on behalf of the labor department or corresponding agency, maintain actions
in the courts of this state upon assigned claims
for wages, judgments, and demands arising in
any other state in the same manner and to the
same extent that the actions by the Industrial
Commission are authorized when arising in this
state. However, these actions may be commenced
and maintained only where the other state by
legislation or reciprocal agreement has extended
the same comity to this state.
1987
34-28-10.

Employers' records — Inspection by
commission.
(1) (a) Every employer shall keep a true and accurate record of time worked and wages paid each
pay period to each employee who is employed on
an hourly or a daily basis in the form required by
the Industrial Commission's rules.
(b) The employer shall keep the records on file
for at least one year after the entry of the record.
(2) The Industrial Commission and its authorized
representatives may enter any place of employment
during business hours to inspect the records and to
ensure compliance with this section.
(3) Any effort of any employer to obstruct the Industrial Commission and its authorized representatives in the performance of their duties is considered
to be a violation of this chapter and may be punished
as any other violation of this chapter.
1987
34-28-11. Commission may employ assistants.
The Industrial Commission, pursuant to the law of
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STATUTES
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Desuetude, Due Process, and the Scarlet Letter Revisited, 1992
Utah L. Rev. 449.
Brigham Young Law Review. — Interpreting Statutes Faithfully — Not Dynamically, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1353.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Common
Law ^ 13 to 18.
C.J.S. — 15A C.J.S. Common Law ^ n t 13
to 15.
Key Numbers. — Common Law o=» 12.

68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally
construed — Rules of equity prevail.
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate,
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2489;
C.L. 1917, § 5839; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-2.

Cross-References. — One form of civil action; law and equity administered in same action, Rule 2, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Statutes are to be liberally construed to give
effect to their purpose and promote justice but
they are not to be distorted beyond the intent
of the legislature. Stanton Transp. Co. v.
Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959).

ANALYSIS

In general.
Amendment of pleadings.
Decisions of foreign courts.
Garnishment proceedings.
Inheritance laws.
Liability of city.
Life insurance.
Penal statutes.
Questions of novel impression.
Remedial statutes.
Rules of equity prevail.
—Forfeitures.
Statutes of foreign states.
Worker's compensation.
Cited.
In general.
This section is mandatory. Hammond v.
Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918).
This section abrogates the common-law rule.
In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757
(1906); State v. Barboglio, 63 Utah 432, 226 P.
904 (1924).
When a statute charges one with a duty or
imposes a burden or a penalty, it must do so
with sufficient clarity that one of ordinary intelligence will understand what he is required
to do, and, in case of alternative choices, he can
comply by selecting the one least burdensome
to him. Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333
P.2d 943 (1959).

Amendment of pleadings.
Requirement in this section that provisions
of statutes and proceedings under them be liberally construed with view to effect statutes'
objects and to promote justice applies, at least
in matter of amendment of pleading, as well
when it is statutes of another state, as when it
is statutes of Utah, that are involved. Pugmire
v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 Utah 115, 72
P. 385 (1903) (decided under prior law).
In action for wrongful death erroneously
commenced by intestate's widow and children,
who were only parties in interest, instead of
properly by personal representative, it was
error for trial court not to allow complaint to be
amended so as to substitute, as plaintiff, widow
in her capacity as administratrix. Pugmire v.
Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 Utah 115, 72 P.
385 (1903) (decided under prior law).
Decisions of foreign courts.
Decisions of courts of other states under statutes differing from those of Utah are not controlling, it being duty of Utah courts to construe statutes of own state and give them such
effect as the Legislature intended, reasoning
from the language used and the purpose in
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78-1-2.4. Number of circuit judges — Replacement authority.
(1) Subject to changes due to the reallocation or elimination of circuit court
positions under Section 20-1-7.6, the number of circuit court judges shall be:
(a) two circuit judges in the First District;
(b) seven circuit judges in the Second District;
(c) ten circuit judges in the Third District; and
(d) three circuit judges in the Fourth District.
(2) On January 1, 1992, the district court and circuit court in the Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Districts are merged into one court. The successor
court shall be the district court and shall be located in those municipalities
where the district courts currently are located. Judges of the successor court
in these judicial districts shall be district court judges as of that date. Judges
of these districts shall stand for unopposed retention election as required by
law.
History: C. 1953, 78-1-2.4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 115, § 6; 1991, ch. 268, § 21; 1991
(2nd S.S.), ch. 7, § 4; 1993, ch. 59, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective March 12, 1993, in Subsection
(1), added the language beginning "Subject"
and continuing to "Section 20-1-7.6" at the beginning of the introductory language and substituted specific numbers for ranges of numbers throughout the subsection; in Subsection

(2), substituted "district court and circuit
court" for "circuit courts" and "merged into one
court" for "established as" in the first sentence
and rewrote the last three sentences by providi n g for SUCcessor courts; deleted former Subsect i o n ( 3 ) ? ending the authority to replace a vac a n t c i r c u i t C 0 U rt judicial position with a court
commissioner position in 1996; a n d m a d e

Hstic changes
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CHAPTER 2
SUPREME COURT
Section
78-2-2.

Supreme Court jurisdiction.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
4
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(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and
(e) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988,
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1; 1992, ch. 127,
§ 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, in Subsection

(4), deleted former Subsections (e) and (f),
which read: "general water adjudication" and
"taxation and revenue; and," respectively,
making related changes; redesignated former
Subsection (g) as Subsection (e); and made stylistic changes in Subsection (e).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992).
Certiorari.
exercising certiorari jurisdiction
When
granted by this section, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, not
° ^ t n e tr * a * c o u r t » therefore, the briefs of the
parties should address the decision of the Court
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court.
Butterfield v. Okubo, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 27
(1992).
Cited in State v. Humphrey, 176 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8 (1991).

ANALYSIS

Appellate jurisdiction.
— Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Certiorari.
Cited,
A
li * • • H* *'
p p
J
*
•—Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Subdivision (3)(e)(iii) confers jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court only over final orders and
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah
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Rule 33. D a m a g e s for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) D a m a g e s for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b> D e f i n i t i o n s . For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) P r o c e d u r e s .
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If t h e award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 33 is
substantially redrafted to provide definitions
and procedures for assessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals.
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court
must award damages. This is in keeping with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the amount of damages — single or
double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended
to make express the authority of the court to

impose sanctions upon the party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid
the conflict created for appointed counsel by
Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).
Under the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by
the defendant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Frivolous appeal.
—Defined.
—Sanctions.
Cited.
Frivolous appeal.
A husband's appeal from a judgment relating to alimony and distribution of marital
Property was frivolous, where there was no baS1
s for the argument presented and the evidence and law was mischaracterized and misstated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah
1987).
Plaintiff's counsel violated rule and was
therefore subject to sanction when, after he investigated plaintiff's
malpractice
action
gainst defendant orthodontist and found that
ne
could not prove breach of duty or causation,

the record was devoid of any relevant, admissible evidence showing negligence, and after losing on summary judgment, he persisted in filing an appeal. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414
(Utah 1990).
An appeal brought from an action that was
properly determined to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under this rule. Utah Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).
—Defined.
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal
is one having no reasonable legal or factual
basis. Lack of good faith is not required.
O'Brien v Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd.
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him, and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or
prejudice.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 20, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Separate trial authorized, U.R.C.P. 42(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

CO. V. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277
(1957).
Insurer
_ . A
,.
.
~ . r- r
—Personal injury action.
-Declaratory action as to effect of policy.
Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insur—-Personal injury action.
ance company as a party defendant in a perCited.
sonal injury action, based on insurance policy
Insurer.
providing that the insurance company "has
agreed to pay a claim only after another claim
—Declaratory action as to effect of policy.
has been prosecuted to a conclusion," did not
One who claims to be damaged by the neglicome within the joinder provision of either
gent act of another is not a proper party to an
Rule 18(b) or this rule. Young v. Barney, 20
action by the insurer of the latter under a pub- Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967).
lie liability policy, whereby a declaratory judgCited in Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404
ment is sought declaring the legal effect of the
P.2d 964 (1965); Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith,
terms of such policy. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 92
et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 12.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 33 to 55; 88
C.J.S. Trial §§ 7 to 10.

Key Numbers. — Parties «=» 13 to 16, 24 to
27; Trial &* 3, 4.

Rule 21. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical
to Rule 21, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
—Sole owner of dissolved corporation.
Added Darties
Trial court had discretion to allow individual
w
Service of process
^ ° w a s s o * e o w n e r °f corporate stock and
—Sole owner of dissolved corporation.
grantee of land in question to join as plaintiff
m
Severance.
action brought by corporation to quiet tax
A,i ,
,.
title to land where corporation had been dis*
solved prior to suit. Falconaero Enter., Inc. v.
—Service of process.
Bowers, 16 Utah 2d 202, 398 P.2d 206 (1965).
Even though sons were necessary parties
and in court during the trial, the court could
Severance.
not make the sons parties defendant without
Severance is within the sound discretion of
service of summons or other process. Monroe
the trial court and, absent abuse of such discreCity v. Arnold, 22 Utah 2d 291, 452 P.2d 321 tion, will not be upset on appeal. King v. Bar(1969).
ron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
§§ 259 to 278.

C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties § 139 et seq.
Key Numbers. — Parties «=> 77 to 92.

Rule 22. Interpleader.
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may
be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objecting to the
joinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their
claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical but are
adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he
is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant

Rule 23
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exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of crossclaim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement and do not in
any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical
to Rule 22(1), F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Attorney fees
r) e n ial
Escrow
Failure to interplead.
—Insurer.
Function of interpleader.
Taxation
Termination.
D e c j s j o n on all issues.
rney ees.
—Denial.
If a party bringing an action has, through
his own fault, caused the conflicting claims necessitating interpleader, it is proper to deny his
attorney's fees. Capson v. Brisbois, 592 P.2d
583 (Utah 1979).

Function of interpleader.
^ n e ^ u n c ^ o n °f a n interpleader is to compel
conflicting complainants to litigate their
claims among themselves. Maycock v. Contin e n t a l Life Ins C o
- 7 9 U t a h 248> 9 P 2 d 1 7 9
(1932).
A n action in
interpleader is a proceeding in
equity in which a person who has possession of
money or property which may be owned or
claimed by others seeks to rid himself of risk of
liability, or possible multiple liability, by disclaiming his interest and submitting the matter of ownership for adjudication by the court.
Terry's Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29
(Utah 1980).
Taxation.
Complaint by taxpayer to compel two counties to interplead as to which was entitled to
tax as result of apportionment by State Tax
C o m m i s s i o n w a s £ld
i n s u f f l c i e n t S e e Union
^
Q
p 4 g 3 ( 1 9 1 g)

scrow.
, , .
ui_I J U
Interpleader statute could be invoked by a
person holding stock m escrow^ Walker v.
Bamberger, 17 Utah 239, 54 P.2d 108 (1898).
Failure to interplead.
Termination.
—Insurer.
Failure of an insurer to bring an action in —Decision on all issues.
interpleader did not constitute an unreasonIf the action in interpleader accomplishes
able delay on its part in making payment unthe purpose for which the plaintiff instituted it,
der a policy, so as to justify a judgment against
it is not necessarily a requisite to its terminasuch company for interest. Maycock v. Conti- tion that it decide all of the issues between the
nental Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d 179 adverse claimants. Terry's Sales, Inc. v.
(1932).
Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29 (Utah 1980).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interpleader
§ 29 et seq.
C.J.S. — 48 C.J.S. Interpleader § 11.
A.L.R. — Amount of attorney's compensa-

tion in absence of contract or statute fixing
amount, 57 A.L.R.3d 475.
Key Numbers. — Interpleader <s=> 14.

Rule 23. Class actions.
(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
(b) Class actions maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v.
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J.
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr.

Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973);
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co , 529 P.2d
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P 2d
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v.
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v.
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v.
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods.
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. &
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial
§ 1077 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448.
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A.L.R.3d 101.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 51, and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial <®=> 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-

ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
—Motion.
Caption.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.
Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Criminal contempt.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
—Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judgments upon multiple claims or parties.
Judicial review.
—Equity cases.
—Standard of review.
——Conclusions of law.
——Criminal cases.
Criminal trials.
——Findings of facts by jury.
——Intent.

Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.
Sufficiency.
—Allegations of pleadings.
—Burden on appeal.
—Found insufficient.
Vacation of judgment.
—Found sufficient.
—Opinion or memorandum of decision.
—Recitals of procedures.
—Technical error.
—Ultimate facts.
Summary judgment.
—Statement of grounds.
Waiver.
—Failure of court.
When filed.
—Tardy filing.
Cited.
Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
In a contract action by a real estate broker
for his commission, where the defendant raises
the issue of abandonment of the contract by his
answer, the court should make findings on the
issue of abandonment. Failure of the trial court
to make findings of fact on all material issues
is reversible error where it is prejudicial.
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278
P.2d 284 (1954).
—Advisory verdict.
The trial court has the responsibility to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law,
notwithstanding the advisory verdict of a jury.
Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d
392 (Utah 1980).'
—Breach of contract.
Where plaintiffs, in action for breach of contract, requested finding by court on material
issue as to whether the foundation of their
house had been located in accordance with zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants, it
was the duty of the court to make such a finding. Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Bldrs., Inc.,
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975).
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ARTICLE I.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Rule 101. Scope.
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extent and
with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101.
Advisory Committee Note. — Adapted
Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in
from Rule 101, Uniform Rules of Evidence
courts of the state including situations previ(1974). Rule 1101 contains exceptions dealing
ously governed by statute, except to the extent
with preliminary questions of fact, grand jury
that specific statutory provisions are expressly
proceedings, miscellaneous judicial or quasi-juretained. Rule 101 also rejects Lopes v. Lopes,
dicial proceedings and summary contempt pro- 3 0 U t a h 2 d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) to the
ceedings. Rule 101 and 1101 are comparable to e x t e n t t h a t i t p e r m i t s ad hoc development of
Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
iftl ^
of c o u r t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e s e
except that Rule 2 made applicable other pro- R u l e g o f E v i d e n c e
cedural rules (i.e., civil/criminal) or applicable
mU
...
, . 0, ,
n
r,u
, , , , ,i
, . , u . .,
! X r> i
The position of the court in State v. Hansen,
statutes to the extent that they relax the Rules
r00Doji^au , i n ^ a ± ± ±*
of Evidence. In addition, Rule 2 of the Utah 5 8 8 P 2* 164 (Utah 1978) that statutory proviRules of Evidence (1971) expressly made the S1°™ of evidence law inconsistent with the
rules applicable to both civil and criminal pro- r u l e s w l U t a k e Precedence is rejected,
ceedings
Cross-References. — Evidence generally,
Rule 101 adopts a general policy making the
§ 78-25-2 et seq.; Rule 43, U.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Bail hearings.
Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah
The former Utah Rules of Evidence were ap1977).
plicable to and controlling at bail hearings.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 68.
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part II, 1987
Utah L. Rev. 467.

Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Judicial Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L. Rev.
67.

Rule 102. Purpose and construction.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 102 is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is an adjuration
as to the purpose of the Rules of Evidence.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1986).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130.

Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked.

(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and Utah case law not involving constitutional
considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is in accord
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah 2d
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford v.
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980);

Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
1981). Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain
error rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441
P.2d 512 (1968).
Cross-References. — Harmless error in admission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61,
U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Bench trial.
Erroneous rulings.
—Cumulative evidence.
—Exclusion.
—Harmless error.
—Objection.
—Offer of proof.
—Substantial right or prejudice.
—Waiver.
Plain error.
Purpose.
Cited.
Applicability.
Adequacy under Subdivision (a)(2) of plaintiffs proffer of expert testimony was irrelevant
where the trial court's exclusion of the testimony was a case management decision and the
substance of the testimony had no bearing on
the court's decision, because the exclusion of
testimony was not an evidentiary ruling to
which Subdivision (a)(2) would apply. Berrett
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992).
Bench trial.
When a trial is to a court, the rulings on
evidence are not of such critical moment as
when a trial is to a jury, because it is to be
assumed that the court has, and will use, its
superior knowledge as to competency and the
effect which should be given evidence. Super
Tire M k t , Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417
P.2d 132 (1966).
Erroneous rulings.
—Cumulative evidence.
Even if refusal to admit photographs was
error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where
the evidence was cumulative and could have
added nothing to defendant's case. Godesky v.
Provo City Corp., 690 P 2d 541 (Utah 1984).

—Exclusion.
When evidence is excluded by the trial court,
any error which may have resulted from such
exclusion is cured when the substance of the
evidence is later admitted through some other
means. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah
1983).
—Harmless error.
Where there was no likelihood that the testimony in question had any substantial bearing
on the outcome of the trial, it was not a cause
for reversal. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968).
Admission of hearsay testimony connecting
defendant with the crime was not prejudicial
where there was other testimony connecting
the defendant to the crime adduced before the
hearsay testimony. State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d
1342 (Utah 1982).
The improper admission of hearsay evidence
was harmless error where the exclusion of such
evidence was not likely to produce a different
result. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111
(Utah 1982).
Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress
certain identification evidence was not a ruling
upon which error can be predicated where
there was other ample evidence of the defendant's culpability. State v. Bullock, 699 P 2d
753 (Utah 1985).
Trial court's error in restricting defense
counsel's cross-examination of the prosecution's key witness concerning bias was harmless, where the jury had sufficient information
to fully appraise the witness's biases and motivations. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah
1987).
Admission of improper impeachment evidence was not prejudicial error, where the testimony did not bear directly on whether defendant did or did not do any of the acts with
which he was charged, and there was no indication that the testimony improperly influ-

without the knowledge of the person making
the communication, may know the content of
the communication Problems of waiver are
dealt with by Rule 507.
The Committee felt that exceptions to the
privilege should be specifically enumerated,
and further endorsed the concept that in the

area of exceptions, the rule should simply state
that no privilege existed, rather than expressmg the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the
privilege The Committee wanted to avoid any
possible clashes with the common law concepts
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Rule 504. Lawyer-client.
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation,
association, or other organization or entity, either public or private, who
is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services.
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the
client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in a rendition of professional legal services.
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto,
on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with
the lawyer concerning a legal matter.
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the
course of representing the client and includes disclosures of the client and
the client's representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative
incidental to the professional relationship.
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services
to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers,
lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in
any combination.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
client, the client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a
deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The
person who was the lawyer at the time of the communication is presumed to
have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were
sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or
fraud; or
(2) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same
deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction; or
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the
client to the lawyer; or
(4) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communication relevant to
an issue concerning a document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or
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(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between two or more clients if the communication was made
by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered
in an action between any of the clients.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 504 is
based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United
States Supreme Court. Rule 504 would replace
and supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2)
and is intended to be consistent with the ethical obligations of confidentiality set forth in
Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Committee revised the proposed rule of
the United States Supreme Court to address
the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981), as
to when communications involving representatives of a corporation are protected by the privilege. The Committee rejected limiting the
privilege to members of the "control group"
and added as subparagraph (a)(4) a definition
for "representative of the client" that includes
within the privilege disclosures not only of the
client and the client's formal spokesperson, but
also employees who are specifically authorized
to communicate to the lawyer concerning a legal matter. The word "specifically" is intended
to preclude a general authorization from the
client for the client's employees to communicate under the cloak of the privilege, but is
intended to allow the client, as related to a
specific matter, to authorize the client's employees as "representatives" to disclose information to the lawyer as to that specific matter
with confidence that the disclosures will remain within the lawyer-client privilege.
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be
directly paid by the lawyer as long as the representative meets the requirement of being engaged to assist the lawyer in providing legal
services. Thus, a person paid directly by the
client but working under the control and direction of the lawyer for the purposes of providing
legal services satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (a)(3). Similarly, a representative of
the client who may be an independent contractor, such as an independent accountant, consultant or person providing other services, is a
representative of the client for purposes of subparagraph (a)(5) if such person has been engaged to provide services reasonably related to
the subject matter of the legal services or

whose service is necessary to provide such service.
The client is entitled not only to refuse to
disclose the confidential communication, but
also to prevent disclosure by the lawyer or
others who were involved in the conference or
learned, without the knowledge of the client,
the content of the confidential communication.
Problems of waiver are dealt with by Rule 507.
Under subparagraph (b) communications
among the various people involved in the legal
matter, relating to the providing of legal services, are all privileged, except for communications between clients. Those are privileged
only if they are part of a conference with others
involved in legal services.
Subparagraph (c) allows the "successor,
trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization,
whether or not in existence" to claim the privilege. Where there is a dispute as to which of
several persons has claims to the rights of a
previously existing entity, the court will be required to determine from the facts which entity's claim is most consistent with the purposes of this rule.
The Committee considered and rejected an
exception to the rule for communications in
furtherance of a tort. Disallowing the privilege
where the lawyer's services are sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud is consistent with
the trend in other states. The Committee considered extending the exception to include "intentional torts," but concluded that because of
the broad range of conduct that may be found
to be an intentional tort, such an exception
would create undesirable ambiguities and
uncertainties as to when the privilege applies.
The Committee felt that exceptions to the
privilege should be specifically enumerated,
and further endorsed the concept that in the
area of exceptions, the rule should simply state
that no privilege existed, rather than expressing the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the
privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any
possible clashes with the common law concepts
of "waiver."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Lawyer-client relationship.
Where attorney advised defendant that he
would not assist defendant in any capacity, legal or otherwise, the relationship of attorneyclient never existed and communications made
by the defendant to the attorney were not privileged. State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275 (Utah
1978).
If a lawyer and his client engage in a criminal conspiracy to commit a crime or a tort, contrary to law and good morals, there is not a
protected confidential relationship as to any

statements made by the client. State v. Carter,
578 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1978).
The standard determining when the presence of a third party during communications
between a lawyer and client results in a waiver
of the attorney-client privilege is whether the
third person's presence is reasonably necessary
under the circumstances, not whether the presence of the third person is necessary for urgent
or life saving procedures. Hofmann v. Conder,
712 P.2d 216 (Utah 1985).

The privilege includes those who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under
the direction of the ph>sician or psychotherapist. For example, a certified social worker
practicing under the supervision of a clinical
social worker would be included. See Utah
Code Ann. § 58-35-6.
The patient is entitled not only to refuse to
disclose the confidential communication, but
also to prevent disclosure by the physician or
psychotherapist or others who were properly
involved or others who overheard, without the
knowledge of the patient, the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are dealt with
by Rule 507.

The Committee felt that exceptions to the
privilege should be specifically enumerated,
and further endorsed the concept that in the
area of exceptions, the rule should simply state
that no privilege existed, rather than expressing the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the
privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any
possible clashes with the common law concepts
of "waiver."
The Committee did not intend this rule to
limit or conflict with the health care data statutes listed in the Committee Note to Rule 501.
Rule 506 is not intended to override the child
abuse reporting requirements contained in
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-501 et seq.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Physician-patient privilege as extending to patient's medical or hospital
records, 10 A.L.R.4th 552.

Rule 507. Miscellaneous matters.
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person or
a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to
the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or fails
to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does
not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication.
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not
admissible against the holder of the privilege if disclosure was
(1) compelled erroneously or
(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege.
(c) (1) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of privilege,
whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper
subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.
(2) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases,
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury.
(3) Jury instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury
might draw an adverse inference from the claim of privilege is entitled to
instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom.
(4) Exception. In a civil action, the provisions of subparagraph (c) do
not apply when the privilege against self-incrimination has been invoked.
Advisory Committee Note. — The subject
matter of Rule 507 was previously included in
Utah Rules of Evidence 37, 38, 39 and 40. The
language recommended by the Committee,
however, is largely that of proposed Federal
Rules 511, 512 and 513, rules not included
among those adopted by Congress.
Proposed Federal Rule 511 became Rule
507(a), replacing Rule 37. Proposed Federal
Rule 512 became Rule 507(b), replacing Rule
38. Proposed Federal Rule 513 became Rule
507(c), replacing Rule 39. No replacement was
adopted for Rule 40 since the Committee determined that the subject matter of that rule need
not be covered by a rule of evidence.
Subparagraph (a). Since the purpose of evidentiary privileges is the protection of some
societal interest or confidential relationship,
the privilege should end when the purpose is
no longer served because the holder of the priv-

ilege has allowed disclosure or made disclosure. For the same reason, although Rule 37
required a knowing waiver of the privilege,
Rule 507(a) as drafted does not require such
knowledge. A stranger to the communication
may testify to an otherwise privileged communication, if the participants have failed to take
reasonable precautions to preserve privacy.
Subparagraph (b). Once disclosure of privileged matter has occurred, although confidentiality cannot be restored, the purpose of the
privilege may still be served in some instances
by preventing use of the evidence against the
holder of the privilege. For that reason, privileged matter may still be excluded when the
disclosure was not voluntary or was made
without an opportunity to claim the privilege.
Subparagraph (c).
(1) Allowing inferences to be drawn from the
invocation of a privilege might undermine the

717 (1922) (referred to in Committee
State v. Green, 578 P 2d 512 (Utah
State v. Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929 (Utah
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah

Note);
1978);
1979);
1986);

State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137.
Green v. Bock Laundry — Federal Rule
609(a)(1) in Civil Cases: The Supreme Court
Takes an Imbalanced Approach, 1990 Utah L.
Rev. 613.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses
§ 569 et seq.
C.J.S. — 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507.
A.L.R. — Permissibility of impeaching cred-

ibility of witness by showing former conviction
as affected by pendency of appeal from conviction or motion for new trial, 16 A.L.R.3d 726.
Propriety, on impeaching credibility of witness in civil case by showing former conviction,
of questions relating to nature and extent of
punishment, 67 A.L.R.3d 761.
Right to impeach credibility of accused by
showing prior conviction as affected by remoteness in time of prior offense, 67 A.L.R.3d 824.
Key Numbers. — Witnesses <^= 345.

Rule 610. Religious beliefs or opinions.
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not
admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the
witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in accord
with Rule 20 [Rule 30], Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971).
Cross-References. — Religious belief not

basis of incompetency as a witness, Utah
Const., Art. I, Sec. 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral.

Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and presentation.
(a) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1)
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to
the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness'
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and restates the inherent power of the court to control the judicial
process. Cf. Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d
210, 461 P.2d 56 (1969). There was no comparable provision to Subsection (b) in Utah Rules
of Evidence (1971), but it is comparable to current Utah case law and practice. Degnan, Non-

Rules Evidence Law: Cross-Examination, 6
Utah L. Rev. 323 (1959). Subsection (c) is comparable to current Utah practice. Cf. Rule
43(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Cross-examination.
Exclusion of witnesses.
Leading questions.
Cross-examination.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in

control of cross-examination by defense counsel. See Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d 210,
461 P.2d 56 (1969).
The latitude that may be allowed in crossexamination is largely within the discretion of
the trial court, to be exercised and governed by
the facts and circumstances of each particular
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JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
Attorneys for Defendant/
Counterclaimant Alan Asay
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ZOLL & BRANCH,

]
Plaintiff,

vs.

]
i

ALAN ASAY,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendant.
ALAN ASAY,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
Civil No. 89-0905672CV
ZOLL & BRANCH,
Judge Michael R. Murphy
Counterclaim Defendant.

The Counterclaim of Defendant/Counterclaimant Alan Asay
having come on for trial on January 8, 1993, before the Third
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding,
the Court having noted that the claims of Plaintiff/Counterclaim

00450

Defendant

Zoll & Branch against Mr. Asay were discharged

in

bankruptcy pursuant to a February 10, 1992 Order of the United
States Bankruptcy Court. The parties have proceeded to trial on the
basis that the discharge does not affect any offsets to which Zoll
& Branch may be entitled against Mr. Asay's Counterclaim.
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Zoll & Branch appeared at
the trial by and through its counsel, B. Ray Zoll and Tom D. Branch
of Zoll & Branch.

Mr. Asay was present and represented by his

counsel, Michael N. Zundel and Jeffery J. Devashrayee of Jardine,
Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn. Mr. Asay first came forward and presented
evidence in support of his Counterclaim, after which Zoll & Branch
came forward and presented evidence in support of its claimed
offsets against Mr. Asay's Counterclaim.
The Court has considered the evidence and credibility of
the witnesses, has carefully reviewed the arguments of counsel and
the brief submitted by Mr. Asay, and has made an independent review
of the pertinent statutes and case law. Now, being fully informed,
the Court hereby finds the following facts and makes the following
conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In early 1987, Mr. Asay was hired as an associate by

the law firm of Zoll & Branch at a salary of $3,000.00 per month.
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Mr, Asay brought with him and used his own office furniture and
furnishings and computer/word processing system.
2.

Mr. Asay performed all of his work for Zoll & Branch

on his computer system using a standard WordPerfect for DOS, word
processing software program. He purchased the WordPerfect software
himself in early 1987.
3.

At the time Mr. Asay became a full-time employee for

Zoll & Branch, he made his computer system available to the firm
and continued to use his own office furniture and furnishings.
4.
toward

At that time, Zoll & Branch agreed to make payments

the cost of Mr. Asay's computer equipment

payments

to

acquisition

the
of

credit

the

card

computer

company
system).

financing
However,

(by making
Mr.
no

Asay's
definite

agreement was reached at that time as to whether or not Zoll &
Branch would actually purchase the computer system and software.
5.

During his employment with Zoll & Branch, Mr. Asay

learned to distrust Mr. B. Ray Zoll. Consequently, near the end of
his employment, Mr. Asay placed the password

"fuckoff" on the

computer system to ensure that he controlled the system until a
final agreement for its purchase was reached.
6.

Mr. Asay placed the password on the word processing

files using the standard WordPerfect command, "Password"/"Add".
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Once the password was revealed, it could be removed by using the
standard WordPerfect command, M Pas sword"/" Remove •'.
7.

In mid-November, 1988, Mr. Asay gave notice that he

intended to terminate his employment with Zoll & Branch and did so
effective December 1, 1988.
8.

The amount of time which Mr. Asay billed during his

employment with Zoll & Branch was fair and consistent with his
obligation to Zoll & Branch and its clients and was fairly and
accurately reported on Mr. Asay's time sheets.
9.

Zoll & Branch did not provide Mr. Asay with adequate

support staff while he was with the firm.

Consequently, Mr. Asay

had to provide many services for himself and for Zoll & Branch
which should have been provided by a non-lawyer support staff.
10.

Near the end of his employment and in conjunction with

his announcement of his intent to leave the firm, Mr. Asay offered
to sell the computer system and his office furniture and furnishings to the firm for $4,356.00.
11.

Following negotiations, Zoll & Branch agreed to buy

only the computer system for $1,030.00, which was the fair market
value of the computer system. Mr. Asay accurately represented all
material facts to Zoll & Branch during the negotiations.
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12.

The exact terms and conditions of the purchase of the

computer system by Zoll & Branch were never finalized or formalized
until after Mr. Asay gave notice of his intent to leave the firm.
13.

Mr. Asay informed Mr. Zoll that he would give him the

password to the files on the computer system in exchange for full
payment.
14.

The exchange occurred on December 1, 1988. On that

date, Mr. Asay also revealed the password to Garry Wilmore, an
attorney hired to replace Mr. Asay.
15.

The password provided full access to every file in the

computer system.

At no time did Mr. Asay sabotage the computer in

any way.
16.

Any problems which Zoll & Branch had in accessing the

computer system either pre-existed the exchange of the password for
the check for the computer system or were the result of Zoll &
Branch or its representatives being untrained or uneducated in the
use of the computer system.
17.

None of Defendant's actions and conduct regarding the

computer system were improper or inappropriate.
18.

After Mr. Asay terminated his employment, he removed

his office furniture and furnishings from the firm and also took
with him some computer diskettes which he had not sold to the firm.
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19.

When Mr. Asay left Zoll & Branch, he left behind all

of his work product pertaining to any case on which he had worked.
Mr. Asay also properly left behind his time sheets at Zoll &
Branch, which should have been found by Zoll & Branch on the
premises with no difficulty whatsoever.
20.

Upon Mr. Asay's departure from Zoll & Branch, he

received the following two checks:

(1) check number 2058 in the

net amount of $1,176.75 for wages accrued during the last two weeks
of his employment, and (2) check number 2059 in the amount of
$1,176.75 as payment for the computer system.
21.

Both

checks

were

dishonored

upon

presentment

on

December 8, 1988 because Zoll & Branch had ordered its bank to stop
payment.
22.

In defense of Zoll and Branch's actions, Mr. Zoll

testified that he stopped payment on the checks because Zoll &
Branch

had

offsetting

claims

against

Mr. Asay.

The

Court

disagrees. Zoll & Branch stopped payment on the checks it issued to
Mr. Asay for the sole reason that Mr. Zoll was angered by the
password after he found out what it was.

Mr. Zoll's testimony

regarding the basis for the offsets claimed by Zoll & Branch is not
credible.
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2
did ..

time prior to Mr, Asay's departure from, the firm

AL no

. anch give any nnl IVI* in MI
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any offset or deduction against the amounts otherwise due Mr. Asay.
24.

Zoll

\

Branch

never

furnished

Mr. Asay

with

a

statement si lowi i ) 1.he 11 >l a 1 amount of ai I/J ieduc t:i on made i rnm his
wages.
25.

Mr. Asay

did not convert

any documents

or other

property of Zoll k flrrinrh to his own use.
26.

Mr, Asay did not make any misrepresentat inmi to liolJ k

Branch regarding any aspect of the computer he sold to Zoll t%
Branch.
27.

Mi,

Asay

doll

no!

the complaint filed :
28.

There

.".Jandoi

V Il I k

lii.iincli

«i ;• J all l e g e * !

in

.;*;.,

^

justificat . :»•

:

Branch's stop

payment or'-icr f

tscks at issue in

this case.
29.

On December

B r a n c h f o r payment of

4

^

.- ^aqt^

"

. :

ie r.ar: :

^1": \

^ accordance with the

Payment

o f Wages A c t ( t l le • "'"ftc
and Mr. A s a y ' s

counter clai

•.. s

.•-:

i.rought

a f t e r t h e demand was r;ade as r e q ^ i r v - i rv
demai id d I d i i ::»t e x c e e a

t .xit; a m< JM i m

-.:.-n

^- A^:

i < H i m i n \ i J itj

aite

.

^.iy.>

"'h-- amount • : : r.n
j ubuy

clue au

t r i a 1 o f t h i s a c t i o n a s mo r e f u 1 1 y e xp 1 a i ne d b e 1 o w.
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the

30

Zol ]

December 1 3 ,
Mr. Asay.

&

Branch

responded

1! 988 , wi lerei n

with

t

i

1 etter

- - -tened

dated

jii I f

acja J list,

On the same day,- Zol I & Branch commenced this action by

filing a Complaint

alleging that Mr. Asdy was liable to Zoil &
,:J in J*

entitled

-

.::ot-t

^

againi'

amounts

uay, &u±±

ne some

c

'

"MI

f In? f i J in w a s

otherwise

&

Branch

owed

to

deposited

* J jfc^-rK of the court with a paper entitled

rei a ier

of Payment" requesting that the clerk of the court hold the funds
until all issues

•• -

. - «•-*• r^~ ved.

3
testimony

on ,
*

*~

. . i

^

;redibl*<

.:•-.:.

;:e testimony

:

Mr', Zoll.
33.

MJ : A say i s enti 1::J ed to recei ve the following monetary

damages from, Zol ] & Branch as a resu ] t of Zoll & Branch/s fa I lure
to pay Mr. Asay hi s wages due and i ts failure to pay for the
computer systent:
Principal
Wages and p e n a i t i e s :
Wage check 12/01/88
Statutory Continuation
of Salary •

*

\

500.00

$

6,000.00
$

• 10

Plus interest from 02/01/1" *
through 01/08/93 @ 10% or
$ 2.0547 9 per diem,, for ] •; • . lays
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Interest

Breach o f Contract:
Computer payment

$

i, J 3 0 . 0 J

Plus interest from 12/01/88
through 01/08/93 § 1 0 % or $ 2821
per diem for 1,498 days

$

327 10

Attorneys f F e e s :
Through preparation of Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of
L a w a n d Judgment

$ 12,000,00

expenses and costs

$

TOTAL DAMAGES:
3:
Ann.

.35.

'

1,602. ? 9

$ 25,411.68

- entitled *

• :a,*.:^

, :
T h e Court has considered al ] of t h e relevant factors

in determi i i i i ig t:l: le reasoi lableness ui uiit: ie*b y M r , A s ay a n d h I s attorneys,

as t h e affidavit of M r

•

" sr« -equested

Tn this raaa.

A s a y , w h o is a licensed attorney i

^

Asay's counsel,

• y of M r .

,:: <- ^as helpfu
v

C o u i: I: a ] s o o b s e r v e d t h e o r g a n i z < *
Asay's counsel conducted the presentatioi
trial

a; interest from

v

••,-;-•:

as well

- lei. T h e
-

: v:: As iy z

i i c 1 i M i:
ase at

All of the services provided b y M r . Asay's counsel, were

rea s ona b 1 e am/1 n ec e s s a ry.

-9-
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36

Tr*

;.*

rates charged to Mr. As ay by his attorneys,

£ light

M- ui f. he J r (hi m legal s, are reasonable in
-*:

>

raining, experience and expertise of the

providers and as raeasurec , * * vfor* s ii'ii i "' *" 'iprv i res
3/.
legal

services

trie ^cixt .uct*

"". IT, * \ : t.v .

were provided
<

.^

tttempts *a

•

actions or
beg\i

rates customarily charged

Through November Tft. v

connecv: - v - fror

,

> i^ >.. -

*\- wages do him

- -.

-

~::

, ^ -v

abandoning

tub

:.•

rail in; t, oay

i iiu| 1 his art I

Zoll & Branch,
Utah kuies ui

' *

before .i : d:\<-: iLis action

*

pressure :•

attorneys

ecoiv:

.ncluding * "• <-* following actions

the • -,

service

:

i tactic I U

legitimate claims

against

refusing to provide discovery" as required by the
LIVII

Procedure., and 4) alleging numerous defenses,

includina factual ly contested offsets , t : • Mr. As ay *"s clai ins
38.
the

U p o n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of all of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s it is

judgmen-

--.: • .* .*;t that

$ 1 2, 000 00
findings o:i
that M r. As^-

: ees
-.

.;;

M r . As ay
tl iroi lgh

shoul d
the

be

awarded

preparatioi i of

asions of law and judgment in this case and

attorneys' out-of-pocket costs of $1,602.79 should

also be awarded.

-10-
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the

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

H I i II II

h

Mr. Asay's unpaid

l i l t J I H *tl

wages

I i

or

* *

the amount

• -

due Mi:. Asay

for

the

computer.
2.

i

z

the check **>*- <
the last ;.

representing Mr. Asa%
. T .:= employment

vL

:

payment, un

, ;.;e. earned durina

;n*. *-v ci< f :

,00

- computer system.

representing payment for
3

. . .

Code in effect

* ..

which provides that

1

,-.. J^

employment was terminated,

.H absence •• *rr, ontractual ; r Dvision- *

the conl
previous notice- ;*

i,

^ii^.i

,,

,a.-

wages at t:» specified place ..I payment it -_:-.- \-int.4.

Z.OU. & Branch

Code in t*ff(*rt

fail!ng \.

at the* time* >

urnish

amount or - -: "
5

* :it;^' \ie^- :

* .r

i< ;

eceive -...
: quitting."

*

* r

x*

. statement showing the * :.J*

«.*

-• * ^** ^ - anu> rr m his wages.
led

I

II

:i:w a i x:i

i >f

$ 1 ,500 00

constituting the gross pay c; •*: Asay's last check recei ved on
December
6,

Mr. Asay is entitled to an award of a civil penalty of

$6,000.00 pursuant to section T4-2y-lj(l) nt the Utah Code in i4U,il
-11-

00460

at the uixiie n.

employment was terminatec

n: r provides

that. in the P
hours ::i •

demand therefo,

continue from the date
e x c e e d in

"

:> waoes

:

. mployee shall

•: reparation until paid, but in no event to

'" yh, al

ame rati? w h i c h I In? e m p l o y e e received a t

the time ..: separation,"
7.

\

The deposit

.

c
wages

* Branch of $i r 176.75 with the

-t * c ^ a "tender" of payment of the
.\: >+, o e c a u s e , ...

:*. '• c

being expressly conditioned

: :

/ : r.

r

nf payment was conditional,

rest:-;ution of all issues i n this

case.
8.

Mr

Asa^

i s ei iti tl ed t : a 1 1 aw a rd of

$2 , 95] 2 9 as

interest accruing from February JI , J 9 88 (the date on which his
wages

stopped

accruing

under

the

applicable

statute)

through
f;

Jan

"--

combined amount of wages and penalt ; <^ owing
date, or $2,0547 9 per diem for
9.

Mr* As ay

\ ce.

--^

- - lay r,.

is entitxeu. L U an award

J.JO

as

$327.1.0

as

payn 1 e 11I 1:oi: LI 1tJ <:oin(.)ut..e 1' 1 -»yK I.ein.
10.

Mr.

As ay

Is

entitled

to

an

award

of

interest accruing from December 1, 1988 through January 8, 19 9 3 at
t o n percent

| I II t \ based en l\ I , O K I . 00

1 lie amount

of the c o n t r a c t

price for the computer system, or $.2 82 1 per diem for 1,498 days..
-12-
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11

Mr, Asay

i a entitled

r e a s o n a b l e aiiotiieyb

iet«h pmsuatit

t o an a w a r d
m

sei i ion

o f $ 1 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 as

,4 2" I ni i no Of tin

Code.
• ^av -: entitles * ~ r*- award of $12,000.00 as

12

n m : l . i t u t i n<|

reasonable

(,

i in-

sequential damages incurred by MJ: , Asay.
I.*

:•*: Asay is entitled to an award of costs and expenses

j I'Tout i o

- , ,ition i n t h e a m o u n t o f $1,-673,79.

1

.-.. .;

-

a m o u n t s a w a r d e d h e r e i n .-' -i

January

-'•

thereafter,

inlet/esl

entitled to interest on the pri ncipal
•:• r a t e o f 1 0 % p e r a n n u m from,, a n d a f t e r

- .-

u d g m e n t is e n t e r e d i i I th is action and

dt, the rate ol 12+.

unpaid portion of the judgment, until paid in full.

Januaryr 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Michael R. Mu:
Mur
Presiding District

CpiirtP^pBge

c:\docs\jjd\p\063.2
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Tab 6

fiLED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR I " md
J^LTLME COUNTY,
Michael N. Zundel (#3755)
Jeffery J. Devashrayee (#6209)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111-1290
Telephone: (80*' "^~ 7700
Attorneys for Defendant/
Counterclaimant Alan Asay
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
ZOLL & BRANCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING
ZOLL & BRANCH'S MOTION
FOR STAY OF EXECUTION AND
RELEASING GARNISHMENT

ALAN AS AY,
Defendant,
ALAN AS AY,
Coui l ber cJ a :i mai it,

9-0905672CV
ZOLL & BRANCH,
7

Countered a :in Defendant,

This matter havirrr ^°irse bef n r Q *-n<=» rnnrf on February
199J.

^

Rule 62ft
proceeding i

: : r. . : ., ". .
r

?u!e;;

i :Ji. : seeking
—

<*T~

- -nay pursuant
—

_

D..^

-.,4-.,

herein;
the

*

: J.-. :'

*

judgment

debtor

i\.

Michae

appearir:

behalf of
fr

Zundel, Esq

Tardinef

Linebaugh, Brown
judgmen'

11

: .?-iit::. ; t;ii?

i.rt: having considered the arguments and

representations ui counsel and good cause appearing therefor; it is
1 lereby
ORDERED, t h a t upon, compliance w i t h a l l of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of
t h i s Order by ZolJ k Branch, a l l p r o c e e d i n g s and a c t i o n s
ni i u i In i I I I in
shall

| in li iitienit (Hit BfO'i I in I h i : i : a s e

be stayed

February 23,
motion
h e a i 11

i i n t i L May i[j,

199 1 ) ,

m until

1 lJ,ll I | III w e e k s
thirty

t n r m>w ! i i.il iinil m o t i o n

days

lo a l t e r

mi I I l» i f j dei I I i, I III m i i >u i I

'

enforce

i n fciv~ ' ~~ * ~~ *~~>v
iiinul

after

Zoll

o r amend

In m ( " " I n r v t " i I i i• ri \ <

rancr; s
judgment a r e

in i '

iiiiiii I i I i

further
ORDERED, that as a condition precedent to the effectiveness
I Ih

In1,

iili-Mcd hiMfiii,

MMII

h lliiinrli /.hall provide securi ty to

Alan Asay, as provided herein, securing payment ot the entire
judgment

p.] us i nterest as provided in the judgment; and

further
I I H M l ' ! Ill I I I

I III II I

1 III

II i I I ! i Hi 1 II I I I 1

II

il I

II III 1 I I I

IH »

M

J

S S

] fIII

Il

I III

Clerk ot the Court be, and same hereby aie f held h\ the tleik ai»
security for payment

judgment issued in flavor of Alan As ay
V till the court on
-2-

J:; .: December
o_

* *;f;"it

Paymer

"<

document *iv izlod

lyBd (pursuant *

- Deposit

eceipt

"Tender
account

issuea

principal amount

f $?5, -JJO .

ORDERED, tha

^ branch, *
* A-.: .- J-

• further

>• v-~ *^ protect

Branch shall execute a security agreement
^he form attached hereto as Exhibit: " ?
^tement; and

ORDEREt
Certificate
name

<- collateral described

further

it I ne L-. Deposit No. 14830034033
:

* "Clerk

•-

eissuec •:.

^ r ! :udiciai District Court, Case No.
r

ORDERED, ; -iat .ii . garnishments heretofore issued pursuant
l ii
n tinI. Judgmen;

! avi .

,.(l ( l

this action, shall be
:e

with this order by nv±L

branch.
TED this

//

day of March, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

SIT IN H y Agreement
!

THIS AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is entered into the
day of March, 1993, by ZOLL & BRANCH, P.C. ("Debtor"), whose
address is 5300 South 360 West, #360, Murray, Utah 84123 (federal
tax ID number 87-0458492), in favor of ALAN B. ASAY, whose address
is 131 Third Avenue, #4, Salt Lake City, Utah
84103 ("Secured
Party-).

Recitals:
ft Judgment.
On February 17, 1993, a Judgment (the
"Judgment") was entered in the case (the "Case") of Zoll & Branch
v. Alan Asay, Civil No. 89-0905672, in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah (the "Court"), for the principal sum of
$25,424.74, together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12%
per annum.
B.
Motion for New Trial.
.db ;. iled with the
court a Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative to Alter or
Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and has requested a stay oi execution pending the
court's ruling on those motions.
C. Security for Stay. Debtor has offerer a certificate
of deposit and funds on deposit with the clerk c * •" — rt as
security for a stay

Agreement:
Article 1
Security Interest
1.1. Grant of security Interest. Debtor hereby grants
Secured Party a security interest (the "Security Interest") in all
of Debtor's right, title and interest, whether now existing or
hereafter acquired, in and to the following (collectively the
"Collateral") in order to secure payment of the entire judgment
plus interest:
Certificate. That certain Certificate of
Deposit (the "Certificate") issued by American Investment Bank as
Certificate No. 14830034033 in the amount of $25,000.00 in the name
of Zoll & Branch, P . C , c, 'o Third District Court, Civil
No. 890505672, and all proceeds derived therefrom however
designated, including money, general intangibles, and substitute
certificates of deposit.

C G 5:: S

deposited with the clerk of
the court in the case on or about December 12, 1988, pursuant to a
document entitled "tender of payment."

Article 2
Status of Collateral
2]
Possession of Collateral. Debtor shall cause the
certificate to be reissued to "Clerk of the Third Judicial District
Court, Civil No, 89-0905672" and the clerk of court shall hold the
certificate and cash for the benefit of Alan Asay in order to
establish and perfect the Security Interest in the Collateral.
Notwithstanding
Secured
Party's
Security
Interest
in the
Collateral, Debtor shall continue to own the Collateral, subject to
the Security Interest and the provisions of this Agreement.
2.2. Accrual Qf interest. All interest that accrues on
the Collateral shall accrue for the account of the Debtor, as owner
of the Collateral, but such interest shall remain subject to this
Security Agreement as part, of the Collatera ]
2.3. Affirmation of Judgment.
If the District Court
affirms Secured Party's Judgment against Debtor, then Secured Party
may, after 30 days following entry of the District Court's Order,
redeem the Certificate and apply the proceeds toward satisfaction
of the Judgmentc-#*^MT *7X«>«~/j< ^^o^£„ ^ /** (?*,»* *^J*])
2.4. Reversal of Judgment.
If the District Court
reverses Secured Party's Judgment against Debtor in whole, then
Secured Party shall release its Security Interest in the
Col lateral.
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//
//

-2-

2.5. Renewal of Certificate. During the term of th I s
Agreement, the clerk of the court may renew the Certificate, or
with the proceeds of the Certificate (or replacement certificates
of deposit), purchase one or more, replacement certificates of
deposit with financial institutions that are insured by the Federal
Deposit Corporation, for terms not to exceed 90 days. All such
renewed or purchased certificates of deposit shall form part of the
Collateral.
American Investment Bank is hereby instructed to
deliver the original certificate and all replacements or reissues
thereof directly t : ' 1_
"
of the court at the following
address:
Clerk of the Court
Tl i :i rd Judicial District '
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attn: David Shewell
DEBTOR:
ZOLL & BRANCH,- F.C.

c;\docs\mnz\d\3 55.1
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COts

Fits? citnawr

CSL^.T
Tnira JLaiciai L/.siiiCt

MAY 2 5 1993
Michael N. Zundel (#3755)
Jeffery J. Devashrayee (#6209)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290
Telephone: (801) 532-7700

SAL."5 L A K E Cy<*>sX.y

By

S AMCJhrtS
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant/
Counterclaimant Alan Asay
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ZOLL & BRANCH,

]
Plaintiff,
|

vs.

ORDER ALLOWING EXTENSION
OF BOND EXPIRATION DATE

ALAN ASAY,
Defendant.
ALAN ASAY,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
ZOLL & BRANCH,
Counterclaim Defendant.

i
]
i
|

Civil No. 89-0905672CV
Judge Michael R. Murphy

;

This matter having come before the Court on May 25, 1993,
upon stipulation to extend the expiration date for the bond
currently in possession of the Court serving as collateral for the
money judgment entered in favor of Alan Asay and against Zoll &

CG5G5

Branch, and it appearing that the parties have stipulated that the
bond will expire on June 25, 1993; the Court having considered the
Stipulation to Extend Bond Expiration Date, and the Court being
otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the expiration date for the bond is extended
for thirty (30) days until June 25, 1993.
DATED this o?<S> day of May, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Hondirable Mi-cfetel 11. Mui^liy
Presading D i s t r i c t Court Judge
c:\docs\jjd\p\109
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FILES SSCT-TTT
Third jjfjic.fc! District

B. Ray Zoll
ZOLL & BRANCH
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 262-1500
Attorney for Plaintiff

JUN 2 3 1333
SALT IAK£ COUNTY
uojju.y Cifcik

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ZOLL & BRANCH
Plaintiff,
vs.
ORDER

ALAN ASAY,
Defendant.
ALAN ASAY,
Counterclaimant,
vs.

Civil No. 89-0905672CV

ZOLL & BRANCH

Judge Michael R. Murphy

Counterclaim Defendant,
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to
Extend Stay of Execution Pending Location of the Court file.
The Court, having reviewed the motion and being fully
advised, hereby grants Plaintiff's motion and extends the
expiration date of the bond at issue in this case until such time
as the Court file can be located and until the Court can make a
ruling on Plaintiff's Request for Expedited Hearing on Motion for
New Trial or in the Alternative Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,
1.

coon

t
DATED this

~l u

y

uV' • ^

^ 3 day of June, 1993,
BY THE COURT:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following, this
day of June, 1993:
Michael N. Zundel
Jeffery J. Devashrayee
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290
Attorneys for Defendant Alan Asay

2.

Tab 7
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUMMARY DECISION
AND ORDER

ZOLL & BRANCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO.

890905672

ALAN ASAY,
Defendant.
ALAN ASAY,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
ZOLL & BRANCH,
Counterclaim Defendant,

Plaintiff and counterclaim defendant has moved for a new trial
or to alter or amend judgment• The motion seeks to change specific
findings.

Plaintiff fails to acknowledge, however, that evidence

is not the equivalent of fact.

The court heard all the evidence

and, after viewing the demeanor of witnesses and making judgments
of credibility, made its findings.

If, as in this case, there is

conflicting evidence, there will necessarily be a conflict between
the findings and some evidence, the evidence which the court
rejected in its role as a factfinder.

C0632

ZOLL V. ASAY

PAGE TWO

SUMMARY DECISION

The court finds it ironic that on the one hand plaintiff
complains that the value of this case did not merit the amount of
fees

incurred

by defendant

and yet complains

that

the

court

improperly limited the time allowed plaintiff to present its case.
The court was very concerned about this case, invoked Rule 611,
Utah Rules of Evidence, allocated 50% of a trial day to each party
and was a timekeeper for the time consumed.

Plaintiff actually

used more time than defendant and had adequate time to present its
claims and defenses. It was the plaintiff's decision how it was to
use its time.

It is the court's view that plaintiff misallocated

its time, spending too much time on unimportant matters and too
little on important matters.
For the forgoing reasons, plaintiff's motion is denied.

The

parties are to confer with the clerk to schedule not more than one
hour for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to augment
fees.

C0633

ZOLL V, ASAY

PAGE THREE

SUMMARY DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Summary Decision and Order, to the following, this
day of July, 1993:

B. Ray Zoll
Attorney for Plaintiff
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360
Murray, Utah 84123
Michael L. Zundel
Attorney for Defendant
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290

-rY7
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Tab 8

F'LED IN CLERK SOFFICE
oalt Lako County
Utah

Michael N. Zundel (#3'
Jeffery J. Devashrayfe
F6209)
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaimant
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1290
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
1/?//£/

ZOLL & BRANCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER AUGMENTING JUDGMENT
AND RELEASING CASH BOND
TO ALAN ASAY

ALAN AS AY,
Defendant.

ALAN AS AY,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
Case No.. 89-0905672 CV
ZOLL & BRANCH,
Judge Michael R. Murphy
Counterclaim Defendant.

This matter having come before the court on August 2, 1993,
upon Alan Asay's Motion to Augment the Award of Costs and Attorneys'

Fees

in this

action; the Court

having

considered

the

affidavit of Michael N. Zundel filed in support of the motion, and
having provided the judgment debtor, Zoll & Branch, opportunity to

cross-examine Mr. Zundel regarding the fees and costs described in
Mr. Asay's motion; and good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the judgment entered in favor of Alan As ay in
this action dated February 17, 1993, be, and the same hereby is,
increased by the principal sum of $ nil.
reimburse

Mr. Asay

for reasonable

costs

sc

in order to

and

attorneys' fees

expended in preserving and collecting said judgment; and it is
further
ORDERED, that the stay of execution heretofore entered in
this action is hereby vacated and the Clerk of this Court is
directed to redeem the certificate of deposit held by this Court as
a cash bond and to deliver the proceeds thereof to Michael N.
Zundel, Esq., Mr. Asay's attorney; and it is further
ORDERED, that Mr. Asay shall, within ten (10) days after
receipt of the funds, file a Notice of Partial Satisfaction in this
action.
DATED this

day of August, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Michael R/Murphy
Presiding District Judge
c:\docs\mnz\p\2764
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Tab 9

B. RAY ZOLL (3607)
ZOLL & BRANCH
5300 South 360 West
Suite 360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 262-1500
Attorney for Plaintiff

^v^V/^^

•Us W *
lr

m

^^iMjiudvj^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ZOLL & BRANCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALAN AS AY,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Defendant.

ALAN AS AY,
Civil No. 89-0905672 CV

Counterclaimant,

Judge Michael R. Murphy

vs.
ZOLL & BRANCH
Counterdefendant.

COMES now Plaintiff Zoll & Branch, by and through its counsel
of record, B. Ray Zoll, pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and appeals the Judgment entered in the
above-captioned case representing as follows:

1.

The party taking the appeal is the Plaintiff, Zoll &

Branch.
1.

C3G50

2.

The Judgments appealed from are the Order Releasing Bond

and Order Augmenting Attorney's Fees, filed the 2nd day of August,
1993, as well as the Order denying Motion for New Trial or in the
Alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend Findings, filed on July 20,
1993.

3.

The Court from which the appeal is taken is the Third

Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

4.

The Court to which the appeal is taken is the Court of

Appeals of Utah.
DATED this

/

day of August, 1993.

%^7

B. &'ay Ztfll /
M
Attorney for /Plain^ff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this \ QT, day of
August, 1993, to the following:
Michael Zundel
Jeffrey Devashrayee
370 East South Temple
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Defendant

CJ651

